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If individuals act without first establishing arrangements with those
whom their actions affect and who affect them, each is likely to be sorry
when he sees the price all will pay.'
In California the power to deal with the problems of effective land
use has been abdicated by the legislature in favor of municipal author-
ities.2 While this may have been appropriate during the early years
of the development of zoning' when "cities, townships, boroughs and
the like were separated by large undeveloped areas,"' 4 it is no longer
possible for one -municipality in a metropolitan area to deal unilaterally
and effectively with all problems of land use.5 Since the early 1940's
1. Heymann, The Problem of Coordination: Bargaining and Rules, 86 HARv. L.
REv. 797 (1973).
2. The legislature has declared its desire to give maximum control over zoning to cit-
ies and counties: "[Ihe Legislature declares that in enacting this chapter it is its inten-
tion to provide only a minimum of limitation in order that counties and cities
may exercise the maximum degree of control over local zoning matters." CAL.
Gov'T CODE ANN. § 65800 (West Supp. 1975). But see id. § 65803 (West 1966)
(limiting the application of that chapter to general law cities and charter cities
which specifically adopt the chapter). This would seem to be consistent with broad
grants of authority in enabling legislation in most states. See, e.g., R. ANmnmsom,
AMEIcAN LAW OF ZONING (1968) [hereinafter cited as ANDERSON]; 2 E. McQUILLIN,
ThE LAw OF MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS § 4.112 (3d ed. 1966),
3. For an overview of the history of zoning in the United States, see D. HAOIAN,
URBAN PLANNING AND LAND DEVELOPMENT CONTROL LAw (1971) [hereinafter cited as
HAGMAN]. For a more extended discussion, see ANDERSON, supra note 2, §§ 2.07-.13;
1 E. YOKLEY, ZONING LAW AND PRACTICE 1-22 (3d ed. 1953).
4. Sussna, Local Zoning is Obsolete, 11 CURRENT MUN. PROB. 335 (1970) [herein-
after cited as Sussna].
5. The need for approaching the problem of land use on an area-wide basis in some
situations has been recognized by the courts (see cases cited in notes 150-69 infra and
accompanying text) and by the commentators (see Becker, Municipal Boundaries and
Zoning: Controlling Regional Land Development, 1966 WASH. U.L.Q. 1; Has, Region-
alism and Realism in Land-Use Planning, 105 U. PA. L. Ray. 515 (1957); Marks & Ta-
ber, Prospects for Regional Planning in California, 4 PAc. L.. 117 (1973); Sussna, su-
pra note 4; Comment, Regional Impact of Zoning: A Suggested Approach, 114 U. PA.
L Rav. 1251 (1966); Comment, Regional Planning and Local Autonomy in Washlng-
ton Zoning Law, 45 WASH. L. REv. 593 (1970); Note, Zoning: Looking Beyond Mu-
nicipal Borders, 1965 WASH. U.L.Q. 107).
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there has been substantial growth in metropolitan areas," growth which
has brought with it many new problems that cannot and have not
been confined within municipal boundaries.7  When one municipality
chooses to use its land in a way that interferes with a neighboring mu-
nicipality's land use, a conflict arises8 for which a means of resolution
must be found if there is to be an efficient use of land resources.
An obstacle to the adoption of a means for resolving this conflict is
the municipal affairs doctrine. This doctrine has emerged from the
constitutional provisions9 which free charter cities10 from the control of
6. In the 1960's alone there was an increase of 16.6% in metropolitan population.
The greatest increase was in the western region of the United States with a 28.3% rise.
This growth was characterized by increased suburban sprawl with urban density decreas-
ing from 3,752 persons per square mile in 1960 to 3,376 persons per square mile in 1970.
E. HASKELL, LAND USE AND THE ENVIRONMENT: PUBLIC POLICY Issu s 10 (BNA En-
viron. Rep., Monograph No. 20 1974).
7. These problems exist in such areas as housing, transportation, pollution control,
and employment. "[Local governments'] geographical jurisdictions are small, although
the environmental problems they must solve know no such boundaries and cover air-
sheds, river basins, economic and transportation regions, and whole metropolitan areas."
Id. at 11.
8. See note 137 infra.
9. CAL. CoNsr. art. XU, § 5.
10. There are two types of cities in California: general law cities, which are incorpo-
rated under the general laws adopted by the legislature, and charter cities, which are
incorporated under article eleven, section three of the California constitution. The. same
section of the constitution provides that "a county ...may adopt a charter . . ."'
CAL. CONST. art. XI, § 3. This section has evidently led some courts to refer to the
right of chartered counties to regulate with respect to municipal affairs. See, e.g.,
Bishop v. City of San Jose, 1 Cal. 3d 56, 63, 460 P.2d 137, 141, 81 Cal. Rptr. 465,
469 (1969); In re Hubbard, 62 Cal. 2d 119, 126-27, 396 P.2d 809, 812-13, 41 Cal. Rptr.
393, 397 (1964). The only reference to municipal affairs, however, is found in article
eleven, section five, which pertains solely to the provisions of city charters. Article
eleven, section five specifies the provisions of county charters (generally dealing with
organization) and makes no mention of municipal affairs. Subsection (g) does provide,
though, that "as to matters for which, under this section it is competent to make provi-
sion in such charter, and for which provision is made therein" (CAL. CONST. art. XI,
§ 5(g)), the charter supersedes general laws. Because of the limited nature of the mat-
ters specified, this cannot be construed as a grant of exclusive control over municipal
affairs.
The exclusion of counties from the coverage of the municipal affairs provision can
perhaps be explained by the fact that
[a] county is a governmental agency or political subdivision of the state, organized
for purposes of exercising some functions of the state government, whereas a mu-
nicipal corporation is an incorporation of the inhabitants of a specified region for
purposes of local government.
County of San Mateo v. Coburn, 130 Cal. 631, 636, 63 P. 78, 80 (1900). The court
in Wilkinson v. Lund, 102 Cal. App. 767, 283 P. 385 (1929), before quoting from other
cases dealing with the authority of counties, stated:
It requires no argument to show that only such provisions of a county charter as
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the general laws'1 (i.e., from legislative interference) with respect to
municipal affairs. While cases indicate that the adoption of land-use
control measures is a municipal affair,12 there are conflicting cases
which indicate that, where a municipal project extends beyond the
borders of the municipality, it is a matter of statewide concern, even
though it would be considered a municipal affair if confined within the
municipal boundaries.' 3
It is the purpose of this Comment to examine these conflicting deci-
sions in the context of a land-use control measure having an external
impact on surrounding communities and to suggest a rationale for con-
cluding that, when individual municipalities cannot resolve the conflict
generated by the external impact of the particular measure, the matter
should not be considered a municipal affair. Before embarking upon
that examination, it will be necessary to discuss briefly the history of
th6 doctrine and some of the problems the courts face in giving mean-
ing to the ambiguous phrase "municipal affairs."
H1. TnE MuNicrmIAL AFFAIRS DOCTRINE
A. History
The municipal affairs doctrine grew out of events of the nineteenth
century. Early in -the second half of that century, city officials found
that they had insufficient power to combat the increasing problems fac-
ing them.'4 Because of this limited authority, municipalities were
forced to turn to the legislature for additional grants of authority in the
are authorized by the Constitution supersede state laws in conflict therewith and
then only to the extent that such provisions are not limited by the Constitution.
Id. at 770, 283 P. at 386. Any statements in cases referring to municipal affairs of
a county must be viewed as clearly erroneous.
11. For cases dealing with the problem of what a general law is, see cases cited in
note 67 infra.
12. See cases cited in notes 84-104 infra.
13. See cases cited in notes 106-33 infra.
14. While the cities and towns remained relatively small, the self-restraint of the leg-
islature was well evident. Peppin, Municipal Home Rule in California 1, 30 CALw. L.
Rnv. 1, 2 (1941) [hereinafter cited as Peppin). It was during the second half of the
nineteenth century that the towns began to grow as a result of technological advances
in industry and an increased level of immigration from abroad. The multiplying prob-
lems of the cities created the marked increase in the frequency of legislative interference
in local affairs. S. SATo & A. VAN ALsrYNE, STATE AND LoCAL GOvnuNMENT LAw 216-
18 (1970) [hereinafter cited as SATo & VAN ALSTNE]. See also H. McBAIN, THE LAW
AND THE PRAcncE oF MuNICmPAL HOME RuLE 5-6 (1916) [hereinafter cited as McBIN];
Peppin, supra at 3.
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form of special legislation.15 This situation lent itself to the influence
of corruption, powerful lobbyists and political spoilsmen.16
The necessity of seeking legislative authority each time a city wished
to act was eliminated by the inclusion of article XI, section 11 of the
California constitution of 1879.17 This section granted to all cities and
counties the power ,to "make and enforce within its limits all such local,
police, sanitary and other regulations as are not in conflict with general
laws.""' Although this represented a broad grant of power to local gov-
ernmental bodies, it did not overcome the problem of legislative inter-
ference with local actions. 19
In 1896, article XI, section 6 was amended to free charter cities from
,the constant tampering with matters which concern only or chiefly the
municipality, under the guise of laws general in form."20 Even though
granting charter cities substantial protection from legislative interfer-
15. This special legislation in California usually conferred extensive powers of self-
government in the form of special charters, but the legislature retained the right to inter-
fere in the affairs of the community, particularly in fiscal matters. Peppin, supra note
14, at 7-22.
16. Professor McBain quoted from the report of the Evarts Commission ("appointed
in 1877 to devise a plan for the government of the cities of New York") as follows:
It may be true, that the first attempts to secure legislative intervention in the local
affairs of our principal cities were made by good citizens in the supposed interest
of reform and good government, and to counteract the schemes of corrupt officials.
The notion that legislative control was the proper remedy was a serious mistake.
The corrupt cliques and rings thus sought to be baffled were quick to perceive that
in the business of procuring special laws concerning local affairs, they could easily
outmatch the fitful and clumsy labors of disinterested citizens.
McBAiN, supra note 14, at 9. The strict construction placed on enabling legislation put
the municipalities at the mercy of the legislature. This strict construction is character-
ized by Dillon's Rule:
(A] municipal corporation possesses and can exercise the following powers, and no
others: First, those granted in express words; second, those necessarily or fairly
implied in or incident to the powers expressly granted; third, those essential to the
declared objects and purposes of the corporation, -not simply convenient, but in-
dispensable. Any fair, reasonable doubt concerning the existence of power is re-
solved by the courts against the corporation, and the power is denied.
1 J. DILLON, COMMENTARIES ON mu LAW OF MUNICIPAL COPORMONS 145 (4th ed.
1890) (footnotes omitted).
17. The first "home-rule" provision was adopted as part of the Missouri constitution
in 1875, and similar provisions have subsequently been adopted in more than half of the
states. SATo & VAN ArsTYs , supra note 14, at 217. One of the objects of the Consti-
tutional Convention of 1879 was to take away from the legislature the power to enact
special legislation and to allocate more power to the municipalities. See Peppin, supra
note 14, at 37.
18. CAL. CONST. art. XI, § 11 (1879). This section has remained substantially un-
changed since 1879. It has been renumbered and now appears at CAL. CONsT. art. XI,
§ 7
19. See notes 65-69 infra and accompanying text.
20. Popper v. Broderick, 123 Cal. 456, 461, 56 P. 53, 55 (1899) (determination of
police officers' and firefighters' salaries held to be municipal affairs).
1975] 435
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bnce by providing that charter cities were subject -to the general laws
-except in municipal affairs,"'" this amendment did not afford complete
protection. Charters continued to be specific grants of power, and un-
less a particular power was enumerated in the charter, the general law
controlled, even though it pertained to a municipal affair22
The 1914 amendment of section 6 corrected 'this situation by provid-
ing that a charter city may
make and enforce all laws and regulations in respect to municipal af-
fairs, subject only to the restrictions and limitations provided in their sev-
eral charters and in respect to other matters they shall be subject to and
controlled by general laws.
2 3
With this amendment, charter cities were freed from all legislative in.
terference with respect to their municipal affairs.24
Cities organized under these constitutional provisions have complete
autonomy ,to deal with matters declared to be municipal affairs. If the
state also chooses to legislate on the matter, the local xegulation will
prevail despite a direct conflict between the local and state measures
and despite the state's intention to occupy the entire field .2  Con-
versely, if the subject matter is a matter of statewide concern, the state
measure will prevail if there is a conflict with the local measure. 20
B. Defining "Municipal Affairs"
In the nearly eighty years since the adoption of the first municipal
affairs provision, no clear-cut definition has been formulated by the
courts. On the contrary, the courts maintain that the determination of
21. CAL. CONST. art. X, § 6 (1896) (Historical Note 1896 amendment).
22. Sato, "Municipal Affairs" in California, 60 CALnw. L. REV. 1055, 1056 (1972)
[hereinafter cited as Sato]; Pacific Tel. & Tel. Co. v. City & County of San Francisco,
51 Cal. 2d 766, 769, 336 P.2d 514, 516 (1959); West Coast Advertising Co. v. City
& County of San Francisco, 14 Cal. 2d 516, 522, 95 P.2d 138, 142 (1939); Stege v.
City of Richmond, 194 Cal. 305, 310, 228 P. 461, 463 (1924), appeal dismissed, 273
U.S. 648 (1926); Civic Center Ass'n v. Railroad Comm'n, 175 Cal. 441, 445, 166 P.
351, 353 (1917).
23. CAL. CONST. art. XI, § 6.
24. Bishop v. City of San Jose, 1 Cal. 3d 56, 61, 460 P.2d 137, 140, 81 Cal. Rptr.
465, 468 (1969); Pacific Tel. & Tel. Co. v. City & County of San Francisco, 51 Cal.
2d 766, 769, 336 P.2d 514, 516 (1959); West Coast Advertising Co. v. City & County
of San Francisco, 14 Cal. 2d 516, 522, 95 P.2d 138, 144 (1939).
25. Bishop v. City of San Jose, 1 Cal. 3d 56, 61, 460 P.2d 137, 140, 81 Cal. Rptr.
465, 468 (1969).
26. Id. at 61-62, 460 P.2d at 140, 81 Cal. Rptr. at 468; Professional Fire Fighters,
Inc. v. City of Los Angeles, 60 Cal. 2d 276, 292-93 n.11, 384 P.2d 158, 168 n.11, 32
Cal. Rptr. 830, 840 n.11 (1963); Pacific Tel. & Tel. Co. v. City & County of San Fran-
cisco, 51 Cal. 2d 766, 769, 336 P.2d 514, 516 (1959).
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whether the subject matter is a municipal affair or a matter of statewide
concern must be made on a case-by-case basis and 'that the concept "is
not a fixed or static quantity," but "changes with the changing condi-
tions. 2 7 An examination of two major cases will help to illustrate the
problems faced by the courts in construing the concept of municipal
affairs and will serve to point out the danger of over-reliance upon leg-
islative intent or purpose.
In Professional Fire Fighters, Inc. v. City of Los Angeles,28 the union
local sued the city claiming that the city had not permitted collective
bargaining. 29 The city responded that, notwithstanding provisions of
the California Labor Code,30 it 'had the sole authority under the munici-
pal affairs doctrine to deal with matters pertaining to the governing of
its fire department.81 Justice Peters, writing for the court, observed
that "[t]he basic question to be determined is whether or not the mat-
ters embraced by the code sections are, when applied to the City of
Los Angeles, exclusively municipal affairs. ' 2 Explaining that the leg-
islative purpose in each case will determine whether or not the subject
matter is of local or statewide concern, 3 the court continued:
In the -instant case it would appear that the Legislature was attempt-
ing to deal with labor relations on a statewide basis. . . . The total
effect of all this legislation was not to deprive local government (char-
tered city or otherwise) of -the right to manage and control its fire de-
partments but to create uniform fair labor practices throughout the
state.
8 4
27. Bishop v. City of San Jose, 1 Cal. 3d 56, 62-63, 460 P.2d 137, 141, 81 Cal. Rptr.
465, 469 (1969), quoting Professional Fire Fighters, Inc. v. City of Los Angeles, 60
Cal. 2d 276, 294, 384 P.2d 158, 169, 32 Cal. Rptr. 830, 841 (1963); Century Plaza Ho-
tel Co. v. City of Los Angeles, 7 Cal. App. 3d 616, 621, 87 Cal. Rptr. 166, 169 (1970).
28. 60 Cal. 2d 276, 384 P.2d 158, 32 Cal. Rptr. 830 (1963).
29. Id. at 279, 384 P.2d at 159, 32 Cal. Rptr. at 831.
30. CAL. LABOR CODE ANN. §§ 1960-63 (West 1971).
31. 60 Cal. 2d at 280, 384 P.2d at 160, 32 Cal. Rptr. at 832; see CAL. LABOR CODE
ANN. §§ 1960-61 (West 1971).
32. 60 Cal. 2d at 291, 384 P.2d at 166, 32 Cal. Rptr. at 838.
33. Id. at 294, 384 P.2d at 169, 32 Cal. Rptr. at 841.
34. Id. at 294-95, 384 P.2d at 169 32 Cal. Rptr. at 841 (emphasis added). The
court's approach is close to that applied in Department of Water & Power v. Inyo Chem.
Co., 16 Cal. 2d 744, 108 P.2d 410 (1940), where the court stated: "If the state statute
affects a municipal affair only incidentally in the accomplishment of a proper objective
of statewide concern, then the state law applies even as to 'autonomous' charter cities."
Id. at 754, 108 P.2d at 416 (citation omitted). This approach ignores the fact that if
the subject matter is of statewide concern, the state statute will control even where there
is direct conflict with a local regulation. The effect of a statute dealing with a state-
wide matter on local interests is irrelevant in terms of deciding what is a matter of state-
wide concern. Cf. Sato, supra note 22, at 1070.
1975]
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While the disposition of the case may have been correct, the court's
reliance on the legislative intent runs counter to the avowed purposes
of the municipal affairs doctrine-to prevent the legislature from inter-
fering with ,the affairs of charter cities 5 and to enable charter cities to
"control their own affairs to the fullest extent in their own way."80 If
the legislative purpose were the exclusive factor in deciding whether
a particular subject is a matter of local or statewide concern, municipal-
ities would once again be subject to legislative interference under the
guise of general laws.8
The problem created by exclusive reliance on legislative intent was
recognized in Bishop v. City of San Jose,88 where the supreme court
noted: "[iThe fact, standing alone, that the Legislature has attempted
to deal with a particular subject on a statewide basis is not determinative
of the issue as between state and municipal affairs . . . ."" Bishop
considered the application to charter cities of Labor Code sections
which required the payment of the prevailing wage on all public works
projects.40 In upholding the trial court's determination that the setting
and payment of city employees' salaries was a municipal affair, the
court stated that, in ascertaining whether or not a matter was of state-
wide concern, the legislative purpose was entitled to great weight and
the factors underlying the enactment of the general law would be seri-
ously considered. 41 The legislature, however, was "empowered nei-
ther -to determine what constitutes a municipal ,affair nor to change such
an affair into a matter of statewide concern." 42
Bishop accurately reflected the allocation of power between the legis-
lature and municipalities with respect to municipal affairs ,and recog-
nized that a particular subject may be of such a nature to justify legis-
lative action applicable to general law cities but not to charter cities.43
35. Cf. McBAM, supra note 14, at 252.
36. Fragley v. Phelan, 126 Cal. 383, 387, 58 P. 923, 925 (1899).
37. See cases cited in note 67 infra.
38. 1 Cal. 3d 56, 460 P.2d 137, 81 Cal. Rptr. 465 (1969).
39. Id. at 63, 460 P.2d at 141, 81 Cal. Rptr. at 469.
40. CAL. LABOR CODE ANN. § 1771 et seq. (West 1971). The plaintiffs, representing
electricians employed by the city, sought injunctive relief and damages for violation of
the Labor Code and for violation of charter provisions requiring competitive bidding on
certain public works projects. The court found it unnecessary to reach the issue of the
charter violations. 1 Cal. 3d at 65, 460 P.2d at 143, 81 Cal. Rptr. at 471.
41. 1 Cal. 3d at 63, 460 P.2d at 141, 81 Cal. Rptr. at 469.
42. Id.
43. Id. at 62, 460 P.2d at 140, 81 Cal. Rptr. at 468. See also Pipoly v. Benson, 20
Cal. 2d 366, 125 P.2d 482 (1942). It should not be concluded from this statement that
a matter may be both a municipal affair and a matter of statewide concern. While both
VCol. 8
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While looking to the legislative intent in resolving the case, the Bishop
court, unlike the court in Professional Fire Fighters, resorted to legis-
lative intent merely to determine ithe scope of the subject with which
the legislature was dealing.4 4 Such reliance is indispensable to the res-
olution of 'any potential conflict between state law and local ordinances
and is consistent with the purposes of the municipal affairs doctrine.Y5
It is important to distinguish between the purposes for resorting to legis-
lative intent, for it is only when legislative intent is used to determine
whether or not a subject is of statewide concern that the municipal af-
fairs doctrine is endangered.
The dissenting opinion of Justice Peters in Bishop is worthy of dis-
cussion both because of its complete disregard of the purposes which
the municipal affairs provisions of the constitution were designed to
serve and because it may give some insight into the problems created
when legislative intent is deemed the critical factor in deciding the mu-
nicipal affairs question. The legislative purpose, according to Justice
Peters, is paramount in determining whether a matter is a municipal
affair or a subject of statewide concern. 46 While he indicated in Pro-
fessional Fire Fighters that the intent of the legislature was determina-
tive,4" the opinion in that case did not go as far as 'his Bishop dissent.
the legislature and a charter city may legislate with respect to the subject, the categories
are mutually exclusive. Sato, supra note 22, at 1072-73. Sato's criticism was directed
at the opinion in In re Hubbard, 62 Cal. 2d 119, 396 P.2d 809, 41 Cal. Rptr. 393
(1964). That opinion declared blithely that, "[o]f course a matter may be both a mu-
nicipal affair and of statewide concern." Id. at 127, 396 P.2d at 814, 41 Cal. Rptr. at
398.
44. The court determined that "the Legislature did not intend that that law apply to
the setting of the salaries of employees of a city, whether chartered or not." 1 Cal.
3d at 63, 460 P.2d at 142, 81 Cal. Rptr. at 470. Such a determination in effect elimi-
nates any need for the court's prior discussion of the application of the municipal affairs
doctrine.
45. See notes 35-36 supra and accompanying text.
46. Justice Peters relied on a statement in City of Redwood City v. Moore, 231 Cal.
App. 2d 563, 42 Cal. Rptr. 72 (1965), that
the Legislature does have the power to change a municipal affair into a matter of
statewide concern, and thus impinge upon local control, where it is the legislative
purpose to deal with the particular subject matter under discussion on a statewide
basis.
Id. at 580-81, 42 Cal. Rptr. at 84. The Bishop majority attributes this language to over-
emphasis on a statement contained in Professional Fire Fighters that legislative purpose
will determine whether a matter is a state or municipal affair. 1 Cal. 3d at 63 n.6,
460 P.2d at 141 n.6, 81 Cal. Rptr. at 469 n.6.
47. The Bishop majority placed an interpretive gloss on the statement by adding a
bracketed phrase and would have it now read: "Mhe question as to whether a matter
is of municipal or statewide concern 'must be determined [by the courts] from the legis-
lative purpose in each individual instance."' 1 Cal. 3d at 63 n.6, 460 P.2d at 141 n.6,
81 Cal. Rptr. at 469 n.6.
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In Bishop, he stated that where the subject matter involves both munici-
pal and statewide concerns or where, though the subject matter involves
primarily a municipal concern, part of the subject matter is of statewide
concern, charter cities may act until such time as the legislature adopts
a conflicting statute or otherwise occupies the field.48 Thus the doc-
trine of state pre-emption" would be substituted for the municipal af-
fairs doctrine, effectively nullifying the municipal affairs provisions of
the constitution. 0  To support such a drastic alteration in the distribu-
tion of power between the legislature and charter cities, Justice Peters
cited what he termed the "proper rule" of Professional Fire Fighters."1
This "rule," for which he claimed the support of "innumerable author-
ities," 52 is followed in Professional Fire Fighters by the caveat that it
should not be confused with the "principle of state preemption,""3 thus
making it clear that the Professional Fire Fighters court considered the
doctrines to be separate and distinct.5 4  The coalescence of the two
doctrines can be avoided if the courts follow the teachings of the Bishop
majority and refuse to rely on legislative intent as the sole determina-
tive -factor in deciding if the application of a general law is of local or
statewide concern.
Reliance on the legislative purpose to determine whether a subject
is of local or statewide concern neglects the local interests that the
municipal affairs doctrine was designed to protect.5 5 The courts, if
they are to deal with this doctrine, must develop an approach which
takes into account the interests of the charter cities as well as the inter-
ests of the state, while allowing sufficient flexibility for consideration
48. Id. at 69, 460 P.2d at 146, 81 Cal. Rptr. at 474.
49. Under this doctrine a municipality may not enact an ordinance which conflicts
with a state statute or which concerns a subject the legislature intends to occupy com-
pletely. See In re Kochne, 59 Cal. 2d 646, 381 P.2d 633, 30 Cal. Rptr. 809 (1963);
In re Lane, 58 Cal. 2d 99, 372 P.2d 897, 22 Cal. Rptr. 857 (1962); Note, Conflicts
Between State Statutes and Municipal Ordinances, 72 HARv. L. Rzv. 737 (1959).
50. The potential result would be a return to the conditions existing prior to the 1896
amendments. See notes 14-20 supra and accompanying text.
51. 1 Cal. 3d at 66, 460 P.2d at 144, 81 Cal. Rptr. at 472. Justice Peters stated:
"The proper rule . . . [is] 'general law prevails over local enactments of a chartered
city, even in regard to matters which would otherwise be deemed to be strictly municipal
affairs, where the subject matter of the general law is of statewide concern.'" Id., quot-
ing Professional Fire Fighters, Inc. v. City of Los Angeles, 60 Cal. 2d 276, 292, 384
P.2d 158, 168, 32 Cal. Rptr. 830, 840 (1963).
52. 60 Cal. 2d at 292, 384 P.2d at 168, 32 Cal. Rptr. at 840. Contrary to his invo-
cation of "innumerable authorities," Justice Peters cited no authority.
53. Id.
54. Cf. id. at 292 n.11, 384 P.2d at 168 n.11, 32 Cal. Rptr. at 840 n.11.
55. See notes 14-15 supra and accompanying text.
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of the changing conditions upon which the doctrine must operate.
They should consider whether the subject is such that it can be resolved
at -the local level, or if the local regulation would materially interfere
with a pervasive state policy.5
6
Applying this balancing of interests approach to the problem faced
by the court in Professional Fire Fighters, a similar result would be
reached. The right of collective bargaining, which was the subject of
dispute in -that case, has come to be recognized as a basic right of most
employees5 7  Such a consideration weighs heavily in favor of providing
regulation on a scale broader than that available at the local level. This
is particularly true when the effect of local regulation on this basic right
is considered. Just as private employers should not be allowed -to de-
termine unilaterally whether or not their employees will have the right
of collective bargaining, neither should individual municipalities have
the right to make such a determination merely on the basis of their
adoption of a freeholder's charter. Application of the balancing ap-
proach to the Bishop facts would support the court's determination,
since the desire to be paid at a particular level does not warrant the
recognition accorded the more basic right of collective bargaining. The
employer and employees should be allowed to work out the rate of pay
on their own. Here -the state interest in protecting city employees is
far outweighed by the right of the municipality to determine the rate
of compensation it will offer to attract those whom it desires ito em-
ploy. 58
56. This is the process that is required if the standards proposed by Professor Sato
are to be applied. He proposes three standards. First, "[s]tate laws should prevail
where such laws deal with substantial externalities of municipal improvements, services,
or other activities, regardless of whether the general laws are directed to the public sec-
tor." Sato, supra note 22, at 1076. The obvious reason for this is that "municipal deci-
sionmakers" would only be restrained from imposing the effects of municipal projects on
those beyond the municipal borders by the threat of retaliation. Id. Compare the dis-
cussion in text accompanying notes 161-208 infra. Second, "[sitate laws should govern
if their policies are made applicable to the public and private sectors." Sato, supra note
22, at 1075. This standard requires the greatest amount of balancing in its application,
for it is only when the state statute exhibits a "deep concern for the welfare of the peo-
ple" that it should control over local ordinances. Id. at 1076-77; see notes 57-58 infra
and accompanying text. Third, "[miatters of intracorporate structure and process de-
signed to make an institution function effectively, responsively, and responsibly should
generally be deemed a municipal affair." Sato, supra note 22, at 1077. The state inter-
ests in the matters covered by this standard are far outweighed by the local interests
and the balance must be struck in favor of the local ordinances.
57. This right is recognized in the National Labor Relations Act, 29 U.S.C. § 157
(1970), and in the CAL. LABOR CoDa ANN. § 1126 (West 1971).
58. Cf. 29 U.S.C. § 158(d) (1970). While there is a duty to bargain in good faith
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Professional Fire Fighters and Bishop demonstrate the difficulty the
courts face in interpreting the ambiguous municipal affairs provisions
of the constitution. This difficulty is particularly evident where the
competing interests are more equally balanced. Such is the situation
with respect to land-use control measures having an external impact.
HI. SHOULD LAND-USE CONTROL MEASURES BE A
MUNICIPAL AFFAIR?
The question of whether or not a land-use control measure (particu-
larly zoning) which has an external impact beyond the boundaries of
the acting municipality should be a municipal affair has not yet been
presented to 'the courts.u When dealing separately with zoning and
external impact questions, -the courts have reached opposite results.
Zoning, or more accurately the adoption of a zoning ordinance or gen-
eral plan, has been considered to be a municipal affair, 0° while ordi-
nances dealing with municipal projects which extend beyond the borders
of the acting municipality have been held to be matters of statewide con-
cern.61 However, because land-use control measures are universally
accepted as a valid exercise of ithe police power,62 there is a preliminary
over "wages, hours, and other terms and conditions of employment," this "obligation
does not compel either party to agree to a proposal or [make] a concession.. . ." Id.
Prevailing wage laws have been upheld as constitutional on the theory that the state as
the employer can, within constitutional limits, establish the wage rate to be paid to its
employees. Metropolitan Water Dist. v. Whitsett, 215 Cal. 400, 10 P.2d 751 (1932).
59. But cf. People ex rel. Younger v. County of El Dorado, 5 Cal. 3d 480, 487 P.2d
1193, 96 Cal. Rptr. 553 (1971). The court sustained the validity of the Tahoe Regional
Planning Agency (CAL. GOV'T CODE ANN. § 66801 (West Supp. 1975)). 5 Cal. 3d at
507, 487 P.2d at 1210-11, 96 Cal. Rptr. at 570-71. After holding that the Agency's
powers with respect to planning and zoning were not local powers, the court continued:
Furthermore, problems which exhibit exclusively local characteristics at certaif
times in the life of a community, acquire larger dimensions and changed character-
istics at others. "It is . . . settled that the constitutional concept of municipal af-
fairs is not a fixed or static quantity. It changes with the changing conditions upon
which it is to operate." When the effects of change are felt beyond the point of
its immediate impact, it is fatuous to expect that controlling such change remains
a local problem to be resolved by local methods.
Id. at 497-98, 487 P.2d at 1204, 96 Cal. Rptr. at 564 (footnotes and citation omitted)
(emphasis added). While this is a strong indication of the direction the court might
take in a case dealing with the external impact of a land-use control measure, the court
qualified its statement: "We do not, of course, say that planning and zoning are in all
instances matters of more than local concern; we merely hold that under the instant facts
they are of regional significance." Id. at 498 n.18, 487 P.2d at 1204 n.18, 96 Cal. Rptr.
at 564 n.18.
60. See notes 85-104 infra and accompanying text.
61. See notes 106-33 infra and accompanying text.
62. The first comprehensive zoning ordinance was adopted in 1916 by the City of
New York. HAGMAN, supra note 2, at 67. The ordinance divided the city into use zones
with height and bulk controls. These zones were laid out on a map, a common feature
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question which deserves brief discussion before turning to an examina-
tion of -these two lines of decisions.
of modem zoning ordinances. The ordinance was upheld in Lincoln Trust Co. v. Wil-
liams Bldg. Corp., 128 N.E. 209 (N.Y. 1920). Prior to this time, cities had adopted
ordinances regulating the use of land in various ways, but were generally limited to the
regulation of nuisance-type activities. See HAGMAN, supra note 2, at 69. Professor Hag-
man presents a lengthy list of Supreme Court opinions of the late nineteenth and early
twentieth centuries dealing with various approaches to the control of land use. ("Until
the 1920's, the courts frequently held zoning ordinances invalid when non-nuisance uses
were prohibited." Id. at 68.)
In 1926, the Supreme Court upheld comprehensive zoning as a valid exercise of the
police power in the leading zoning case, Village of Euclid v. Ambler Realty Co., 272
U.S. 365 (1926). The Euclid case was the first Supreme Court decision dealing with
the power to enact a comprehensive zoning ordinance. The ordinance in question di-
vided the village into six classes of use districts, three classes of height districts, and
four classes of area districts. In upholding the ordinance, the Court maintained:
mhe reasons are sufficiently cogent to preclude us from saying, as it must be said
before the ordinance can be declared unconstitutional, that such provisions are
clearly arbitrary and unreasonable, having no substantial relation to the public
health, safety, morals, or general welfare.
Id. at 395. In Nectow v. City of Cambridge, 277 U.S. 183 (1928), the Court found
a zoning ordinance to be "a mere arbitrary or irrational exercise of power." There, the
city zoned a comer parcel for residential use. The area on the opposite sides of the
streets to the north and the west was also zoned for residential use, but the parcels adja-
cent to the property in question were unrestricted. The plaintiff's property remained
essentially unusable for residential development.
In the most recent case, Village of Belle Terre v. Boraas, 416 U.S. 1 (1974), the
Court upheld the right of a town to zone exclusively for single-family residential use.
In addition to allowing only single-family use, the ordinance defined "family" as "[o]ne
or more persons related by blood, adoption, or marriage, living and cooking together
as a single housekeeping unit, exclusive of household servants." Id. at 2. The
ordinance was challenged by a group of students from the nearby State Univer-
sity at Stoney Brook who had rented a house in the village, on the grounds that it
violated the fourteenth amendment's equal protection clause. The majority opinion,
written by Justice Douglas, did not address the issue of the external effects of the zoning
ordinance on the surrounding communities, but concentrated on the power of a com-
munity to zone in order to preserve "family values, youth values, and blessings of quiet
seclusion, and clean air. . . ." Id. at 9. The Court reiterated and reinforced the pre-
sumption of the validity of a zoning ordinance by quoting with approval from Euclid
the statement that "'[ilf the validity of the legislative classification for zoning purposes
be fairly debatable, the legislative judgment must be allowed to control."' Id. at 4, quot-
ing Village of Euclid v. Ambler Realty Co., 272 U.S. 365, 388 (1926). This presump-
tion has long been an accepted part of California zoning law. See, e.g., Consolidated
Rock Prods. Co. v. City of Los Angeles, 57 Cal. 2d 515, 522-23, 370 P.2d 342, 347,
20 Cal. Rptr. 638, 643 (1962); McCarthy v. City of Manhattan Beach, 41 Cal. 2d 879,
885-86, 264 P.2d 932, 935 (1953); Lockard v. City of Los Angeles, 33 Cal. 2d 453,
460-61, 202 P.2d 38, 42-43 (1949); City of Los Angeles v. Gage, 127 Cal. App. 2d 442,
450-51, 274 P.2d 34, 38-39 (1954). See generally Walsh, Are Local Zoning Bodies Re-
quired By The Constitution To Consider Regional Needs?, 3 CoNN. L. REv. 244, 261-62
(1971); Comment, The General Public Interest vs. The Presumption of Zoning Ordi-
nance Validity: A Debatable Question, 50 J. Uan. L. 129 (1972).
Justice Marshall, dissenting in Belle Terre, disputed the majority's conclusion that no
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A. The Police Power and the Municipdl Affairs Doctrine
It is not clear from the wording of the constitution, nor from court
interpretations, whether or not police power measures were to be in-
cluded within the 1896 and 1914 amendments extending autonomous
home rule to charter cities with respect to their municipal affairs.08
One commentator has argued that the police power provisions were
not affected by the municipal affairs provisions, but rather that the pur-
pose of the mumicipal affairs amendment was to deal with the problems
created by the judicial definition of "general laws."0 4  The California
constitution of 1879 provided that all cities were to be subject to the
general laws 5 and could enact "all local, police, sanitary, and other or-
dinances not in conflict with general laws."60 The term "general laws"
was expansively interpreted by -the courts to include any law which ap-
plied generally to cities even though the law concerned only matters
local in nature. 67  These holdings were subjected to much criticism in
the dissents of Justice McKinstry 68 and later of Justice Fox. 0  They
fundamental rights were involved. It was his "view that the ordinance in this case un-
necessarily burdens appellees' First Amendment freedom of association and their consti-
tutionally guaranteed right to privacy." 416 U.S. at 15. Justice Marshall also recog-
nized the potential external effect the ordinance might have. Id. at 16 n.4.
In California, zoning regulations have not yet been elevated to "takings," requiring
just compensation. The question of what constitutes a taking is still unsettled. See F.
BOSSELMAN, D. CALLIES & I. BANTA, TnE TAKING IssuE: AN ANALYSIS OF THE CONSTI-
TUTIONAL LWIvrs oF LAND Usn CONTROL (1973); Michelman, Property, Utility, and
Fairness: Comments on the Ethical Foundations of "Just Compensation" Law, 80
HARV. L. Rtv. 1165 (1967) [hereinafter cited as Michelman].
63. See notes 17-26 supra and accompanying text.
64. Sato, supra note 22, at 1095.
65. All charter and general law cities were to be "subject to and controlled by the
general laws." CAL. CONST. art. XI, § 6 (1879) (repealed June 2, 1970).
66. CAL. CoNsT. art. XI, § 11 (1879) (repealed June 2, 1970); see note 18 supra.
67. See, e.g., Davies v. City of Los Angeles, 86 Cal. 37, 24 P. 771 (1890) (statute
dealing with street improvement assessment); Ex parte Ah You, 82 Cal. 339, 22 P. 929
(1890) (statute dealing with establishment of a police court and election of a police
judge); People ex rel. Daniels v. Henshaw, 76 Cal. 436, 18 P. 413 (1888) (statute pre-
scribing method of selecting police judge); Thomason v. Ashworth, 73 Cal. 73, 14 P.
615 (1887) (statute dealing with street improvement); Staude v. Board of Election
Comm'rs, 61 Cal. 313 (1882) (statute dealing with election of officers in local govern-
mental bodies).
The court's interpretation largely negated any beneficial effect derived from the pro-
hibition of the use of special legislation contained in article four, section twenty-five of
the 1879 California constitution.
68. People ex rel. Daniels v. Henshaw, 76 Cal. 436, 18 P. 413 (1888); Thomason
v. Ashworth, 73 Cal. 73, 14 P. 615 (1887); Staude v. Board of Election Comm'rs, 61
Cal. 313 (1882) (McKinstry, J., concurring in the dissent of Sharpstein, J.).
69. Davies v. City of Los Angeles, 86 Cal. 37, 24 P. 771 (1890); Ex parte Ah You,
82 Cal. 339, 22 P. 929 (1890).
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contended that a general law was one which applied to those within
and without the city and that the legislature could not act to amend a
freeholder's charter by passing a law applicable only to local affairs of
the cities.70 As was noted earlier, the delegation of the police power
and the charter city provisions were contained in separate sections.
The 1896 amendments, however, -applied only to the provisions author-
izing the formation of cities under a freeholder's charter. 71 This, it was
contended, supports the position that -the municipal affairs amendments
were meant to free the charter cities from the constant interference by
the legislature under the guise of general laws (which resulted from
the broad interpretation given that term by the judiciary), while the po-
lice power measures were to remain subject to the general laws and
were not included within the scope of the municipal affairs provisions.72
While the authority to organize under a freeholder's charter and the
delegation of the police power were contained in separate sections in
the constitution of 1879, neither section contained a broad grant of au-
thority to act. The 1896 amendment was intended to result in a broad
reallocation of power from the legislature to charter cities. By adoption
of a charter, a city could remove itself from the control of the general
laws over all matters expressly provided for in the charter if the matters
were deemed to be municipal affairs. The extensive grant of power
was not accompanied by any limitation with respect to police power
measures. Subsequent amendments to the municipal affairs provisions
support this more expansive interpretation. The 1914 amendment au-
thorized charter cities "to make and enforce all laws and regulations
in respect to municipal affairs. . . and in respect to other matters they
shall be subject to and controlled by general laws. ' 73  This language
indicates that these provisions contained all the authority required by
any charter city to act on any subject matter including matters which
would fall within the police power. The only question to be resolved
was whether a particular subject was a municipal or state affair.
In the almost eighty years since the adoption of the municipal affairs
amendment, the courts have failed to define the extent of municipal
authority under the municipal affairs powers, although they have dealt
generally with police power measures of charter cities. The dicta of
these cases leaves the question ambiguous and unresolved.
70. See cases cited in notes 67-68 supra.
71. Notes 20-21 supra and accompanying text.
72. Sato, supra note 22, at 1095.
73. CAL. CONSr. art. XI, § 6 (1914) (emphasis added).
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In the early case of May v. Craig,74 the court discussed the question
of whether or not building regulations were to be considered municipal
affairs:
In our opinion, the construction of improvements upon private property
within a city is not a municipal affair. The city has no interest therein
or control thereof, except such control is made necessary for the protec-
tion of the public welfare, and the only power which the city can exer-
cise in relation to such private structures must come from the police
power delegated by the constitution to such charter cities; and this police
power is expressly made subordinate to the general law.75
Craig would seem to be of questionable authority when contrasted with
more recent decisions on zoning and general planning. Without dis-
cussing the issue of whether a police power measure could be consid-
ered a municipal affair, the California Supreme Court subsequently de-
dared that the "procedure regulating the issuance of permits for the
erection of buildings within its territorial limits [is] undeniably a 'mu-
nicipal affair .... "76
In another early case, In re Hitchcock,7 the court of appeal answered
in the affirmative the question of whether or not "the licensing and reg-
ulation of a private patrol service or system within. . the city...
[was] a 'municipal affair.' "78 The court noted:
The most frequent and usual form in which a municipality manifests its
control over its municipal affairs is in the passage of police and sanitary
laws. . . and when a city, either through its charter or ordinances, un-
dertakes to provide a scheme for such protection in relation to a subject
matter which is not either expressly by the Constitution, or impliedly
from its nature, committed to state control, the subject matter thus laid
hold upon by the municipality becomes a municipal affair over which
the state legislature may no longer exercise control.
79
While one might seriously question the statement that the most fre-
quent way in which a municipality exercises its control over its munici-
pal affairs is by the adoption of police or sanitary laws, ,the fact that
74. 13 Cal. App. 368, 109 P. 842 (1910).
75. Id. at 369-70, 109 P. at 843.
76. Lindell Co. v. Board of Permit Appeals, 23 Cal. 2d 303, 310, 144 P.2d 4, 9
(1944), quoting Brougher v. Board of Pub. Works, 205 Cal. 426, 437, 271 P. 487, 492
(1928). The Brougher court distinguished May v. Craig, 13 Cal. App. 368, 109 P. 842
(1910), by finding that there was no general statute regulating the height of buildings
and thus no conflict with the local regulation. 205 Cal. at 437, 271 P. at 492.
77. 34 Cal. App. 111, 166 P. 849 (1917).
78. Id. at 114, 166 P. at 850.
79. Id.
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a measure enacted under the police power could be considered a mu-
nicipal affair is of great significance."0
More recent cases have uniformly assumed that a police power mea-
sure could be considered a municipal affair.81  Although not expressly
confronting the issue, these cases have held either -that the subject mat-
ter was of statewide concern and therefore not a municipal affair, 2 or
that there was no conflict between -the local regulation and the state
law.83  While it is not clear what the courts might do if squarely pre-
sented with the issue, the balance struck by past cases and a reading
of the constitutional language lead to the conclusion -hat the scope of
the municipal affairs doctrine is sufficiently broad to encompass police
power measures.
B. Zoning as a Municipal Affair
Many courts, in finding zoning generally ,to fall within the ambit of
municipal affairs, have failed to distinguish between the procedure for
enacting zoning ordinances and the subject matter of the ordinances."4
The cases have usually been limited to holding that zoning procedures
constitute a municipal affair but have overlooked the question of
whether or not the substantive aspects of zoning decisions should -also
be considered within the ambit of the municipal affairs doctrine.
In Brougher v. Board of Public Works, 5 the court examined -the va-
lidity of a zoning ordinance enacted by a charter city in light of the
city's failure to comply with the procedure prescribed in the state's en-
80. That police power regulations could be municipal affairs was recognized in two
other decisions. In City of San Mateo v. Railroad Comm'n, 9 Cal. 2d 1, 68 P.2d 713
(1937), the court, after noting that the powers granted by article eleven, section eleven
of the California constitution were available to all cities, stated: "As to such regulations
as come within the definition of municipal affairs the city could remove itself from the
operation of general laws by organizing under a freeholders' charter . . . ." Id.
at 8, 68 P.2d at 716. In Porter v. City of Santa Barbara, 140 Cal. App. 130, 35
P. 207 (1934), the court sustained the city's right to regulate the promotion and conduct-
ing of boxing events, despite the conflict with a state statute, on the grounds that the
subject matter was a municipal affair. Id. at 132, 35 P. at 208.
81. See, e.g., Lindell Co. v. Board of Permit Appeals, 23 Cal. 2d 303, 144 P.2d 4
(1943).
82. See, e.g., Pipoly v. Benson, 20 Cal. 2d 366, 125 P.2d 482 (1942); Ex parte Dan-
iels, 183 Cal. 636, 192 P. 442 (1920); Horwith v. City of Fresno, 74 Cal. App. 2d 443,
168 P.2d 767 (1946).
83. See, e.g., In re Cox, 3 Cal. 3d 205, 474 P.2d 992, 90 Cal. Rptr. 24 (1970); In
re Hubbard, 62 Cal. 2d 119, 396 P.2d 809, 41 Cal. Rptr. 393 (1964).
84. See cases cited in notes 85-104 infa.
85. 205 Cal. 426, 271 P. 487 (1928).
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abling act."0 Previous cases holding that "the zoning power of free-
holder chartered cities . . . is derived from the [state enabling act]"8 7'
were relied upon by petitioner to support the general applicability of
the enabling act. The court, although acknowledging the existence of
these holdings, noted that "[i]n every instance . . . it has also been
stated that such power is also derived from the constitution of the
state." 's It is not at all clear, however, that the pre-Brougher courts
were referring to the municipal affairs provisions and not to the police
power provisions of the constitution, or that they intended the zoning
power of a charter city to come within the protection of the municipal
affairs doctrine. Nevertheless, the Brougher court maintained that
none of the previous cases decided the question of whether or not the
state enabling act was applicable to charter cities.80 By equating the
adoption of zoning procedures with the adoption of other municipal or-
dinances, the court concluded that the enabling act was inapplicable to
charter cities because "[ilt has repeatedly been held . . . that the man-
ner of enacting municipal ordinances is a municipal affair." °
Assuming the validity of the Brougher holding, it does not necessar-
ily -follow that, because the procedure for adopting zoning ordinances
is a municipal affair, the subject matter of a zoning ordinance, i.e., the
division of the city into varied use districts, should likewise be consid-
86. The enabling act in force at the time provided that the city council require the
city planning commission to recommend appropriate zoning regulations and prohibited
the council from enacting such an ordinance until after the filing of the commission's
final report and the holding of a public hearing. The city adopted a zoning ordinance
after giving only the notice required by its charter for all ordinances and did not submit
the proposed ordinance to the planning commission for its recommendations. Id. at 430-
31, 271 P. at 489.
87. Id. at 435, 271 P. at 491, citing Dwyer v. City Council, 200 Cal. 505, 253 P. 932
(1927), Fourcade v. City & County of San Francisco, 196 Cal. 655, 238 P. 934 (1925),
Zahn v. Board of Pub. Works, 195 Cal. 497, 234 P. 388 (1925), Miller v. Board of
Pub. Works, 195 Cal. 477, 234 P. 381 (1925), and A.C. Blumenthal & Co. v. Cryer,
71 Cal. App. 668, 236 P. 216 (1925).
88. 205 Cal. at 436, 271 P. at 491.
89. Id.
90. Id. at 438, 271 P. at 492 (citations omitted). It could be argued, however, that
since a zoning ordinance essentially involves the restriction of the owner's right to use
his property as freely as he might without the zoning ordinance and for which restriction
no compensation is required, the application of additional safeguards would be required
to prevent arbitrary action on the part of the municipalities. When this is the case, the
establishment of such safeguards should not be left to individual municipalities, but
should be considered a matter of statewide concern for which the legislature could estab-
lish procedures applicable to all cities including charter cities. When such protections
are not required, the proper procedure for the adoption of ordinances may properly be
left to the charter cities.
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ered a municipal affair. The courts, however, have not shown any in-
clination toward reversing this holding 91 and in recent cases dealing
with the adoption of a general plan, have continued to hold that the
manner of its adoption is a municipal affair.
92
A further development of the concept that the adoption of ordinances
is a municipal affair is found in Fletcher v. Porter." There, citizens of
Palo Alto presented an initiative petition to the city council calling for
a special election to enact an ordinance to require the adoption of a
master plan and the prohibition of zoning changes permitting manufac-
turing or industrial uses until the Planning Commission had recom-
mended a master plan to the council. The council refused to submit
the initiative to the electorate.94
The court rejected the city's contention that the initiative process
could not be used to abrogate the authority granted by the legislature to
deal with statewide affairs:
To the extent that it attempts to adopt by reference sections 65460-
65516 of the Government Code relating to the procedure for adopting
a master plan, it is local in nature; the adoption of a master plan effects
no statewide consequences.95
91. See Lindell Co. v. Board of Permit Appeals, 23 Cal. 2d 303, 144 P.2d 4 (1943)
(procedure for the issuance of building permits is a municipal affair); Lima v. Wood-
ruff, 107 Cal. App. 285, 290 P. 480 (1930) (the manner of adopting a zoning ordinance
is a municipal affair).
92. See, e.g., Duran v. Cassidy, 28 Cal. App. 3d 574, 104 Cal. Rptr. 793 (1972);
O'Loane v. O'Rourke, 231 Cal. App. 2d 774, 42 Cal. Rptr. 283 (1965); Fletcher v.
Porter, 203 Cal. App. 2d 313, 21 Cal. Rptr. 452 (1962).
93. 203 Cal. App. 2d 313, 21 Cal. Rptr. 452 (1962). This was a proceeding in man-
damus to compel the examination of signatures on the petition and to compel the city
council either to enact the ordinance or to submit it to the electorate.
94. Id. at 316, 21 Cal. Rptr. at 453.
95. Id. at 319, 21 Cal. Rptr. at 455. The sections of the Government Code re-
ferred to by the court required a planning commission of a city or county to adopt "a
comprehensive, long-term general plan for the physical development of the city, county,
area, or region." Ch. 1355, § 2, [1953] Cal. Stat. 2917 (repealed ch. 1880, § 8, [19651
Cal. Stat. 4350) (similar sections now appear at CAL. Gov'T CODE ANN. § 65350 et seq.
(West 1966)). The plan could also cover "land outside its boundaries which in the
commission's judgment bears relation to its planning." Id. The elements that could
be included in a master plan were set forth in former sections 65463-74. Ch. 1355,
§ 2, [1953] Cal. Stat 2917-19 (repealed ch. 1644, § 44, [1955] Cal. Stat. 2973, and
ch. 1880, § 8, [19651 Cal. Stat. 4350) (similar sections now appear at CAL. Gov'T CODE
ANN. § 65350 et seq. (West 1966)). The remaining sections specified procedures for
adopting master plans.
It should be noted that section 65500 indicated a recognition by the legislature that
the adoption of a master plan may indeed affect those beyond the confines of the mu-
nicipal border. That section provides in part: "Master regional plans shall be coordi-
nated with similar plans of adjoining regions, and area, county, and city master plans
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If by this the court meant the procedure by which a master plan is
adopted, it is consistent with other opinions holding that the method
of adopting an ordinance is a municipal affair. °6 However, if it meant
that the necessity of adopting a master plan or its content was a munici-
pal affair, it is logically incorrect. Later in the opinion, the court, after
concluding that provisions of the proposed ordinance97 did not consti-
tute zoning, stated: "But even if we dealt with a zoning ordinance here,
we must still observe that zoning is a 'municipal affair' over which a
charter city has supreme control and which lies beyond the scope of
legislative action."98
In two other cases involving the right of the electorate to amend the
general plan through the initiative process, similar language was used.
The first of these cases, O'Loane v. O'Rourke,99 dealt with the powers
of a general law city, and for this reason it is unclear from the opinion
what importance attaches to the court's statement -that "[t]he matter
of the adoption of a general plan in a city is purely a local matter
and is not a matter of statewide legislative concern."'100 It is also un-
clear whether or not the court realized .the full impact of the statement
that "[mI]any facets of activities between other public agencies and the
city are effectively determined by the plan."''1  It is at least -arguable
that the court's language suggests recognition of the potential external-
ities of city planning and that, if the issue were whether or not a charter
city had the power to deal with the subject matter to the exclusion of the
state's general laws, the language could support a holding that city plan-
ning is not a municipal affair. At the present time, no case has con-
shall be coordinated so as to fit properly into the master plan for the region." Ch.
1355, § 2, [1953] Cal. Stat. 2919 (repealed, ch. 1880, § 8, [1965] Cal. Stat. 4350)
(similar sections now appear at CAL. Gov'T CODE ANN. § 65350 et seq. (West 1966)).
96. See text accompanying notes 85-91 supra.
97. Subsection (f) was designed to maintain the status quo until the remaining provi-
sions could be carried out. 203 Cal. App. 2d at 317-18, 21 Cal. Rptr. at 458 (1962).
98. Id. at 324, 21 Cal. Rptr. at 458 (emphasis added) (dictum). The court cites Lin-
dell Co. v. Board of Permit Appeals, 23 Cal. 2d 303, 144 P.2d 4 (1943), to support
this proposition. The Lindell case, however, stated that only the procedure for issuing
building permits is a municipal affair (id. at 310, 144 P.2d at 9) and not that zoning,
as such, was a municipal affair. See cases cited in note 91 supra. The facts of the
case, presenting a question of the procedure for adopting a zoning ordinance, did not
warrant the loose language of the court.
99. 231 Cal. App. 2d 774, 42 Cal. Rptr. 283 (1965).
100. Id. at 783, 42 Cal. Rptr. at 288. The court failed to consider the potential im-
pact that the general plan of one municipality may have on the neighboring municipali-
ties. In the metropolitan areas such a possibility is substantial.
101. Id. It is confusing how the court can recognize this fact and still find the matter
of adopting a general plan to be a "purely local matter."
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sidered the ability of a charter city to adopt a general plan which affects
inhabitants of areas beyond its municipal border.
The second case, Duran v. Cassidy,102 involved a charter city, and
the court addressed itself to the powers of such a city to adopt a general
plan: "The adoption and amendment of a general plan is a local legis-
lative matter and not of statewide concern." 103  The statement, though,
is merely dictum as the court was assuming without any evidence that
the project, which the initiative proposal sought -to prohibit, was
"part of a general plan of the city."104 Without such an assumption,
the court could not have reached the municipal affairs issue.
Brougher, Fletcher, O'Rourke, and Cassidy recognize that there are
important local interests in land-use control which must be considered
in any attempt to deal with the problem on a scale broader than that of
municipality-by-municipality. None of these cases, however, can be
cited for any proposition other than that the adoption of a zoning ordi-
nance or general plan by a charter city is a municipal affair. The cases
do not hold that the content of or necessity for a municipal zoning ordi-
nance is a municipal affair, nor do they cover a situation where there is
an apparent impact on areas beyond the municipal borders.
C. Projects Beyond the City's Border-Not a Municipal Affair
When dealing with a challenge to a public improvement project
which extends beyond the municipal boundaries, courts have consis-
tently held that the improvement may not be considered a municipal
affair.' 0 5 This principle was recognized in Gadd v. McGuire,10 6 which
discussed the constitutionality of the City Boundary Line Act. 0 7 The
City of Los Angeles inaugurated proceedings under -the Act to construct
a storm sewer system which lay partly within and partly without the
city boundaries. When the board of public works of the city refused
102. 28 Cal. App. 3d 574, 104 Cal. Rptr. 793 (1972).
103. Id. at 583, 104 Cal. Rptr. at 800.
104. Id.
105. See, e.g., Wilson v. City of San Bernardino, 186 Cal. App. 2d 603, 611, 9 Cal.
Rptr. 431, 436 (1960).
106. 69 Cal. App. 347, 231 P. 754 (1924).
107. Ch. 496, [1911] Cal. Stat. 1018. The Act authorized the improvement of streets
running along the border of a municipality by means of forming an assessment district
with the consent of each municipality or county involved. The work authorized by the
Act "include[d] construction of sanitary sewers, storm sewers, drains, and drainage sys-
tems for sanitary or drainage purposes in or along the streets which form or cross the
exterior boundary or boundaries of such municipalities .... " 69 Cal. App. at 351,
231 P. at 756.
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to execute a contract awarded by the city council, the individual to
whom the contract was awarded brought a mandamus 'action ,to compel
the execution of the contract. The board defended on the basis that
the subject matter was a municipal affair and that to the extent the
Boundary Line Act purported to authorize action with respect to a mu-
nicipal affair, it was unconstitutional.10 8 The court first noted that the
charter itself declared that any powers it contained with respect to im-
provements were supplemental to powers granted to all municipalities
by the general laws' 0 9 and, therefore, the expressed election to proceed
under the general law was within the scope of the city's powers.
Secondly, the court held ,that -the Act did not deal with a municipal af-
fair.11  In defining the term municipal affair, the court stated:
An improvement may not be said to be a "municipal affair," within the
meaning of the constitution, if it is not of special concern to the inhab-
itants of, or to the owners of property in, the particular city .... If
it is of general concern to the inhabitants and property owners of a city
m ..in common with inhabitants . . . of the state at large . . it is
not a purely "municipal affair". .. .
This definition did not aid in the resolution of the problem,11 2 but the
meaning became more definite when the court referred to the Act as
authorizing an improvement which "does not lie wholly within any one
city. . . and which does not concern alone or especially the inhabitants
...of any one city. .. ."' When the court used the phrase "spe-
cially concerns," it appears that it intended to limit the scope of the
municipal affairs doctrine with respect to municipal improvement
projects to those which are constructed within the city boundaries and
which have no effect on inhabitants beyond the borders of the city. 1 4
108. 69 Cal. App. at 353, 231 P. at 757.
109. Id. at 353-54, 231 P. at 757.
110. Id. at 355, 231 P. at 759.
111. Id. at 355, 231 P. at 757.
112. When is a matter of special concern to the inhabitants of the city? When is
a matter of general concern to the inhabitants in common with inhabitants of the state
at large? The court's statement offers little by way of substance in defining municipal
affairs.
113. 69 Cal. App. at 355, 231 P. at 758 (emphasis added). This statement lends sup-
port to the conclusion that a land-use control measure which has an external impact
should not be a municipal affair.
114. There is a community of interest between inhabitants within and without the mu-
nicipal boundaries.
[Municipal improvements] may and do become affairs of a broader scope which
cannot be handled adequately by the municipal authorities of a single city or town
for the reason that they... affect the inhabitants... of two or more cities or
towns... in such a way that the purposes sought to be accomplished by the im-
provement pan be effe~ted only by a single, comprehensive shemne ....
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The externalities of municipal improvements" 5 were further ex-
amined when the constitutionality of the Metropolitan Water District
Act was challenged in City of Pasadena v. Chamberlain."6  The Act
authorized the formation of a water district encompassing several mu-
nicipalities."17  It was challenged on the basis that it conferred powers
on charter cities beyond those conferred by their charters and thus con-
stituted an interference with the municipal affairs of the city."" In up-
holding the Act, the court found that its purpose was the equitable dis-
tribution and use of water throughout an area and concluded that when
the purpose or subject matter necessarily transcends the municipal
boundaries, it ceases to be a municipal affair." 9
Both Gadd and Chamberlain considered attempts by the legislature
to establish procedures whereby municipalities, including charter cities,
could band together to deal with problems which could not properly be
dealt with by any one of them acting alone. 20 The taking of combined
action enabled each municipality to confer a benefit on the other par-
ticipating governmental bodies12 by adding to the resources available
to combat the particular problem. While factually distinguishable from
most situations involving the external costs created by a single munici-
pality's zoning decision, 2 ' these cases do support the proposition that
Id. at 357, 231 P. at 759. Similar language can be found in other cases treating mu-
nicipal projects which transcend local boundaries. E.g., Henshaw v. Foster, 176 Cal.
507, 169 P. 82 (1917); Pasadena Park Improvement Co. v. Lelande, 175 Cal. 511, 166
P. 341 (1917); Pixley v. Saunders, 168 Cal. 152, 141 P. 815 (1914); Van de Water
v. Pridham, 33 Cal. App. 252, 164 P. 1136 (1917).
115. See cases cited in note 114 supra.
116. 204 Cal. 653, 269 P. 630 (1928).
117. Id. at 655, 269 P. at 631.
118. Id. at 659, 269 P. at 632-33.
119. The impossibility or impracticability of any one or more of such municipali-
ties acting separately and independently in the acquisition and distribution of such
water would seem to argue conclusively that in achieving such object by the means
provided for in said act the municipalities engaged therein could not be held to be
engaged in the conduct of a merely municipal affair.
Id. at 660, 269 P. at 633. A similar result was reached in Pixley v. Saunders, 168 Cal.
152, 141 P. 815 (1914), where the court upheld the Sanitary District Act of 1891
against a challenge that it interfered with the municipal affairs of the community.
120. See generally City of Sacramento v. Southgate Recreation & Park Dist, 230 Cal.
App. 2d 916, 41 Cal. Rptr. 452 (1964); Wilson v. City of San Bernardino, 186 Cal.
App. 2d 603, 9 Cal. Rptr. 431 (1960); Brooks, The Metropolis, Home Rule, and the
Special District, 11 HAsINGS L.J. 246 (1960).
121. Any benefits received, though, might be minimized by such costs as the contribu-
tion of support to the district.
122. See cases cited in notes 149-72 infra; Ellickson, Alternatives to Zoning: Cove-
nants, Nuisance Rules, and Fines as Land Use Controls, 40 U. Cm. L. RaV. 681, 684
(1973) [hereinafter cited as Ellickson].
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the action of a charter city cannot be considered a municipal affair when
it affects those beyond its borders.
Additional support for the proposition that actions of a charter city
having an impact beyond its borders are not municipal affairs is found
in the more recent case of Pacific Telephone & Telegraph Co. v. City
& County of San Francisco.123 In Pacific Telephone, the court consid-
ered the question of whether or not "the construction and maintenance
of telephone lines in the streets and other public places within the city
today [is] a matter of state concern or a municipal affair .... ""I
The city contended that the construction was a municipal affair over
which it had exclusive control and over which it had plenary power to
grant franchises for telephone construction within the city.12 5 The
court rejected this argument on the basis of evidence which tended to
show that the effect of the city's exercise of exclusive control would
extend not only to control over the telephone communications system
of the city, but also to control of telephone communications throughout
the state, the country, and even the world.126  The power of exclusive
control necessarily includes the power of exclusion with a possible re-
sulting interruption in the telephone communication system within and
without the city. The possibility of a substantial external impact, no
matter how speculative, led the court to conclude that
it is apparent that because of the interest of -the people throughout the
state in the existence of telephone lines in the streets in the city, the
right and obligation to construct and maintain -telephone lines has be-
come a matter of state concern.
27
Similarly, in City of Santa Clara v, Von Raesfeld, 12 8 a bond issue to
finance Santa Clara's share of an "inter-municipal water pollution-con-
trol facility"' 29 became the subject of litigation. The court, although
123. 51 Cal. 2d 766, 336 P.2d 514 (1959).
124. Id. at 767, 336 P.2d at 515.
125. Id.
126. If the telephone lines were removed from -the streets in the city, the people
throughout the state, the United States, and most parts of the world who can now
communicate directly by telephone with residents in the city could no longer do so.
Id. at 773, 336 P.2d at 518. Though it does not appear that the city intended to take
such drastic action, the possibility of local interference with a matter affecting the state
as a whole is sufficient to remove the subject matter from the exclusive control of a
charter city.
127. Id. at 774, 336 P.2d at 519.
128. 3 Cal. 3d 239, 474 P.2d 976, 90 Cal. Rptr. 8 (1970).
129. Id. at 243, 474 P.2d at 977, 90 Cal. Rptr. at 9. The city was unable to sell
the bonds at the prescribed rate of interest. The city council subsequently passed a res-
olution authorizing the sale of bonds at an increased rate in accordance with an urgency
measure passed by the legislature. The original bond election authorized the issuance
[Vol. 8
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noting that "the treatment and disposal of city sewage" and the financ-
ing of sewage facilities have historically been regarded as municipal af-
fairs, 80 stated:
As in the case of other municipal projects, however, sewer projects may
transcend the boundaries of one or several municipalities .... In such
circumstances the project "ceases to be a municipal affair and comes
within the proper domain and regulation of -the general laws of the
state."1 '
What emerges from the Gadd, Chamberlain, Pacific Telephone, and
Von Raesfeld decisions is the proposition that improvement projects of
charter cities that transcend municipal boundaries cannot be considered
municipal affairs. While the rationale of these cases seems sufficient
to encompass land-use control measures, the narrower holdings of
these cases are insufficient to assure general applicability to a subject
matter previously identified as a matter of local concern 32 and where
the extent of the external impact is less obvious..
3
IV. A BAsis FOR DECISION
While the courts have only recently recognized that zoning ordi-
nances have an external effect on surrounding areas 34 or can be justi-
fied on the basis of land use in the surrounding areas,' 35 they have not
recognized the reciprocal nature of conflicting demands for the use of
land resources. For example, if City A decided to zone an area near
of the bonds with a maximum interest rate of six percent per annum. The urgency meas-
ure, CAL. Gov'T CODE ANN. §§ 53540-41 (West Supp. 1975), authorized the issuance
of the previously authorized bonds at seven percent per annum. 3 Cal. 3d at 243, 474
P.2d at 977, 90 Cal. Rptr. at 9.
130. 3 Cal. 3d at 246, 474 P.2d at 979, 90 Cal. Rptr. at 11. The City Manager re-
fused to issue the bonds without another election as required by the city charter.
131. Id., 474 P.2d at 980, 90 Cal. Rptr. at 12. Professor Sato criticizes the rationale
of the Von Raesfeld decision, contending that the court failed to distinguish between the
substance of pollution control laws and the procedure for enacting them. He argues that
the former is properly subject to the control of the state, while the latter belongs within
the jurisdiction of the locality. Sato, supra note 22, at 1086.
132. See cases cited in notes 85-106 supra.
133. The impact in many cases, while physical in nature (e.g., increased traffic flow
or pollution), will be less clear to the casual observer than is the impact of an improve-
ment project.
134. See, e.g., cases cited in notes 150-69 infra and accompanying text.
135. See, e.g., Valley View Village, Inc. v. Proffett, 221 F.2d 412 (6th Cir. 1955);
Town of Los Altos Hills v. Adobe Creek Properties, Inc., 32 Cal. App. 3d 488, 108 Cal.
Rptr. 271 (1973); Lionshead Lake, Inc. v. Wayne Township, 89 A.2d 693 (N.J. 1952),
appeal dismissed, 344 U.S. 919 (1953). See generally Note, Zoning: Looking'Beyond
Municipal Borders, 1965 WAsH. U.L.Q. 107.
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its border to allow construction of a commercial district, City B might
complain that the proposed commercial development would interfere
with its existing residential use of the area on its side of the border.
Traditional analysis, which would only consider ways to control City A's
action, neglects the fact that, but for the use to which City B puts its
land, City A would be able to use its land in the way that it desires.18 0
The question in such a situation, then, is not who is responsible for the
externality, for both are responsible; rather, the question is how to
avoid the conflict with the least cost to society. 87
A. Externalities
Before the question of how the conflict should be resolved can be
answered, the externalities which caused the conflict must be identi-
fied. While the term externalities has been variously defined, 8 it is
used here to denote the effect of City A's action, taken in pursuit of a
136. Cf. Coase, The Problem of Social Cost, 3 J. IAw & EcoN. 1, 2 (1960) [herein-
after cited as Coase]; Sax, Takings, Private Property and Public Rights, 81 YALE L.L
149, 151-55 (1971) [hereinafter cited as Sax].
137. This cost is measured by the decline in value of all of the land affected by the
conflict. The value to society of a particular use is generally reflected in the market
value of that use. Note, An Economic Analysis of Land Use Conflicts, 21 STAN. L.
REv. 293, 297, 299 (1969) [hereinafter cited as Economic Analysis]. The market value
of a particular use is expressible in a lump sum of money and "is exactly equivalent
to the right to receive the particular future benefits encompassed in the property under
consideration." H. BABcocK, APPRaISAL PRINCIPLES AND PROCEDURE 95 (1968).
Market value should not be confused with market price. Market price is the price
actually asked or paid for any particular use and may be more or less than the value
of a particular use. The difficulty of assigning value to subjective costs may lead the
market mechanism to misstate the value of a particular use to society. Economic Analy-
sis, supra at 297.
Professor Ellickson has identified the loss in value of the property resulting from con-
flicting land uses as nuisance costs. In addition, he identifies two other types of costs,
prevention costs and administrative costs. Prevention costs represent the costs incurred
by either party in reducing nuisance costs. Administrative costs represent public and
private expenditures in obtaining "information, negotiating, writing agreements and laws,
policing agreements and rules, and arranging for the execution of preventive measures."
Ellickson, supra note 122, at 689; cf. Michelman, supra note 62, at 1214-15.
138. See, e.g., R. McKoN, EFFICIENCY IN GOVERNMENT TnROUGH SYSTEMS ANALY-
SIs 134 (1958) [hereinafter cited as McKAN] ("impact of actions by some . . . on
the activities of others .. . not directly felt by the first group"); DeVany, Eckert, Mey-
ers, O'Hara & Scott, A Property System for Market Allocation of the Electromagnetic
Spectrum: A Legal-Economic-Engineering Study, 21 STAN. L. REv. 1499, 1509 (1969)
[hereinafter cited as DeVany] ("some social cost or benefit . . . which was not taken
into account by the owner in deciding how to use his property rights"); Hirsch & Sha-
piro, Some Economic Implications of City Planning, 14 U.C.L.A.L. REv. 1312, 1316
(1967) ("an external economy is an external effect that tends to increase the value of
a neighboring property. An external diseconomy has the opposite impact").
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legitimate purpose, on the enjoyment that City B derives from the use
of its property.139
It is also necessary to make a further distinction between types of
externalities, since not all externalities affect the efficient allocation of
resources. 140  Those that do are referred to as technological external-
ities and those that do not are referred to as pecuniary externalities.' 41
Generally defined, technological externalities are those which affect the
physical satisfaction (output) derived from a given input (land use),'
42
while pecuniary externalities are those which do not affect the physical
output or satisfaction derived from physical inputs.' 43  To achieve the
most efficient allocation of resources, it is only necessary to consider
technological externalities, 44 because it is the satisfaction derived from
the use of property that is paramount in zoning decisions.
In practice, this distinction is often difficult to make because an ac-
tion may create both types of externalities. 45 For example, locational
changes may occur because of some pecuniary externality. To the ex-
139. Mishan, The Economics of Disamenity, 14 NATRAL REs. J. 55, 57-58 (1974)
[hereinafter cited as Mishan]. In the true economic sense such an effect ceases to be
an externality when it has been internalized. Id. "Internalized" describes the state of
affairs that exists when the costs of A's action are considered by A in deciding to take
the action. Internalization is a method of conflict resolution. See note 187 infra.
140. While efficiency is generally accepted as the goal in decisions regarding the al-
location and use of resources, government cannot ignore the problem of the "fairness"
of the distribution of the benefits of the resources. These two goals, efficiency and
fairness, are inextricably intertwined in most government actions. It is possible, though,
for government to take an action which would not achieve the highest level of efficiency
if the action has a generally equalizing effect on distribution of the products of resource
use. Cf. Michelman, supra note 62, at 1181-83. See generally note 180 infra.
141. McK.AN, supra note 138, at 135-36.
142. Id. at 135. McKean uses the example of "a storage dam [which] raises the wa-
ter table so as to impair the productivity of surrounding acreage . . . ." Id. The un-
productiveness of the land resource causes a definite loss to society. Id. A decision
by City A allowing development of an area within its boundaries which would generate
increased traffic flow through adjacent residential areas in City B would result in a de-
crease in the satisfaction derived from the residential land. This decrease represents a
cost to society; the resource (land) is no longer producing the same level of output (sat-
isfaction).
143. Id. at 136. Pecuniary externalities are characterized by shifts in prices which
result in resources being attracted to different uses because of action taken by City A;
there is no decrease in the level of production caused by the shift. Id. at 137.
144. If City A zoned an area to allow commercial development, it would be likely
to cause a shift downward in the price of similarly zoned land in City B. This might
cause that land to be sold for a loss (or at least for a smaller profit) by the owner,
but it would not decrease the production derived from the land; the same level of output
would be obtained from the same unit of input. For a more detailed discussion of pecu-
niary externalities, see id. at 136-41.
145. Id. at 150.
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tent that a change in location will alter the physical output from a given
input, it is a technological externality. 1 6 Another particularly confus.
ing aspect is that the distinction between pecuniary and technological
externalities in land-use cases is often obscured because both may be
reflected in the price of a parcel of land.1.4  Thus changes in market
price may or may not accurately reflect technological externalities.
For instance, suppose that City A zones an area near its border"
4 8
for commercial use and that the development of an attractive shopping
center causes the demand for commercial property in City B to drop.
The decreased demand may be reflected in the market price of land
in City B. Since there is, however, no reduction in the level of pleasure
or satisfaction derived from each unit of input, the effect represents a
pecuniary externality and should not be considered by City A. Now
suppose that City A's decision to allow commercial development will
cause increased traffic on streets in the surrounding area, including
those running through City B, and will result in increased noise. Each
of these activities will reduce the amount of enjoyment that residents
in City B can derive from the residential use of their land. To the
extent that the satisfactions derived from the use of a person's land are
reflected in the price others will pay for it, the impact of City A's rezon-
ing decision will be measured by a reduction in the market price.
While the result in both situations is the same, the externality in the
latter situation affects the satisfaction (output) derived from the use
of the land (input) and is therefore a technological externality which
should be considered by City A in reaching a decision about rezoning.
While some courts have considered the external effect of zoning on
surrounding communities, 149 they have not made any distinction be-
146. Id. at 143.
147. Id. at 144.
148. Cf. id. at 143. This seems to be a common occurrence. See cases cited in notes
151-71 infra and accompanying text.
149. The Supreme Court, in Village of Euclid v. Ambler Realty Co., 272 U.S. 365
(1926), noted that there might be "cases where the general public interest would so far
outweigh the interest of the municipality that the municipality would not be allowed to
stand in the way." Id. at 390. The New Jersey Supreme Court has said:
What may be the most appropriate use of any particular property depends not only
on all the conditions, physical, economic and social, prevailing within the munici-
pality and its needs, present and reasonably prospective, but also on the nature of
the entire region in which the municipality is located and the use to which the land
in that region has been or may be put most advantageously. . . . Changes in meth-
ods of transportation as well as in living conditions have served only to accentuate
the unreality in dealing with zoning problems on the basis of the territorial limits
of a municipality. ...
Duffcon Concrete Prods., Inc. v. Borough of Cresskill, 64 A.2d 347, 349-50 (N.J. 1949);
see cases cited in note 136 supra and notes 151-71 infra.
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tween types of externalities. The following examination, however, will
show that the externalities on which the courts have focused generally
fall within the definition of technological externalities, although some
pecuniary externalities were considered. In Borough of Cresskill v.
Borough of Dumont,'5 ° the Borough of Dumont amended its zoning or-
dinance to change a one block area, lying on its border with Cresskill
and two other municipalities, from a residential to a business zone.
The adjacent areas within the adjoining municipalities were zoned and
developed for residential purposes. The amendment was challenged
by owners of lots on the block in question and by the neighboring
boroughs on the grounds that the ordinance failed to
take into consideration the physical, economic, and social conditions pre-
vailing throughout the entire area of [the] four municipalities and the
use to which the land in that region can and may be put most advanta-
geously, and that [there was] . . . utter disregard of the contiguous resi-
dential areas of the plaintiff boroughs.'51
The court, although recognizing that the borough's zoning decision
could adversely affect the adjoining communities, 52 did not attempt to
distinguish between types of externalities. The evidence presented at
the trial reveals that both technological and pecuniary externalities
were considered. Both sides presented evidence of the effect of the
ordinance on property values. To the extent that a reduction in value
reflects a decrease in satisfaction derived from the use of the property
for residential purposes, 1 3 it represents a technological externality and
should be considered in the zoning decision. To the extent that such
a reduction in value only represents reduced rents or shifts in resources,
it represents a pecuniary externality and should not be considered.'5 4
Other evidence indicated that the zoning decision would cause increased
traffic, lack of parking, and potential safety hazards."55  These effects
are related directly to the satisfaction derived from the use of the resi-
150. 104 A.2d 441 (N.J. 1954).
151. Id. at 442.
152. Id. at 445-46. The holding in the case was that the rezoning of the block con-
stituted spot zoning (zoning a small area of land differently from the surrounding area
where such a change "is not in the public interest or is not in accord with a comprehen-
sive plan" (HAGMAN, supra note 3, at 169-70)). The court also avoided deciding
whether or not residents of the adjoining boroughs had standing to challenge the zoning
ordinance of Dumont. 104 A.2d at 444.
153. Justice Douglas described the amenities of residential neighborhoods in Village
of Belle Terre v. Boraas, 416 U.S. 1, 9 (1974); see note 59 supra.
154. See text accompanying notes 141-69 supra.
155. 104 A.2d at 444.
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dential property and should be considered a technological external-
ity.1
5 6
The New Jersey courts were again presented with a similar question
in Borough of Roselle Park v. Township of Union., 7 A developer ap-
plied for and was granted a variance to allow construction of a three-
story senior citizens' housing project in a residential zone near the mu-
nicipal border. Roselle Park, an adjacent municipality, challenged the
granting of the variance on the ground that Union failed to consider
evidence of the external impact of its decision on Roselle Park. The
evidence pointed to the possibility of increased traffic flow, flooded
conditions in Roselle Park, and increased population density in the
area.' 5 Each of these factors can be properly categorized as a tech-
nological externality; each would interfere with the use of the property
and should be considered as a cost of the proposed project. Again the
court did not attempt to categorize the externalities, but this failure was
insignificant since the court held that, "contrary to plaintiff's claims,
. . . the variance would not increase traffic congestion, cause flooding
or add to the population density of the area."' 9
In California, a similar factual context was presented in Scott v. City
of Indian Wells.' 60 The city granted a conditional use permit' al for
the construction of a planned condominium development in an area for-
merly zoned for single-family residential use.' 62 In granting the per-
mit, the council refused to consider the views of the surrounding non-
city resident property owners.' 63  The court recognized that the zoning
decisions of municipalities often transcend the municipal boundaries
and that "it is clear that the development of a parcel on the city's edge
will substantially affect the value and usability of an adjacent parcel on
156. When such effects are present, the municipality
[alt the very least . . . owes a duty to hear any residents and taxpayers of adjoin-
ing municipalities who may be adversely affected by proposed zoning changes and
to give as much consideration to their rights as they would to those of residents
and taxpayers of [the acting municipality].
Id. at 445-46.
157. 272 A.2d 762 (N.J. 1970).
158. Id. at 763.
159. Id. at 767 (reporter's note).
160. 6 Cal. 3d 541, 492 P.2d 1137, 99 Cal. Rptr. 745 (1972).
161. This permit allows a property owner to use his property in a way not normally
allowed in the existing zone, thus allowing flexibility in the application of a compre-
hensive zoning scheme. It is a privilege and not a right and is therefore usually left
to the discretion of the zoning authority of the municipality. See generally HAGMN,
supra note 3, at 206-11.
162. 6 Cal. 3d at 544, 492 P.2d at 1138, 99 Cal. Rptr. at 746.
163. Id. at 545, 492 P.2d at 1138, 99 Cal. Rptr. at 746; see note 161 supra.
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the other side of the municipal line."164  Although requiring the munic-
ipality to recognize and consider externalities, 16 5 the court did not at-
tempt to analyze the externalities actually created. By recognizing,
however, that municipal development affects the usability of adjacent
parcels, steps were taken in the right direction.
The United States District Court for the Northern District of Cali-
fornia, in Construction Industry Association v. City of Petaluma,168
recently examined the external impacts of local growth regu-
lations. Extensive findings discussed the external effects of Peta-
luma's ordinance limiting the number of permits for new housing con-
struction that could be issued in each year. The court found that such
a limitation would have far-ranging effects on the housing market
within the San Francisco metropolitan region. By limiting the supply
of housing within a growth center, the city forced those seeking new
housing to look elsewhere, thus increasing the demand in those areas
with a resulting increase in the cost of private housing.1 6 7  This, stand-
ing alone, would seem to be a pecuniary externality; the reduction in
the supply of one product causes a shift in demand to other products
164. 6 Cal. 3d at 548, 492 P.2d at 1141, 99 Cal. Rptr. at 749. The court also stated
that "[wle have come to recognize that local zoning may have even a regional impact."
Id., citing People ex rel. Younger v. County of El Dorado, 5 Cal. 3d 480, 492-94 n.16,
487 P.2d 1193, 1201 n.16, 96 Cal. Rptr. 553, 561 n.16 (1971). If this is an accurate
view of the court's outlook today, it indicates that zoning could be declared a non-mu-
nicipal affair when the appropriate fact situation is presented. See notes 83 & 113 supra.
165. After discussing authorities from other jurisdictions, the court concluded:
We are satisfied that the City of Indian Wells owes adjoining landowners who
are not city residents a duty of notice to the extent given similarly situated city
residents, a duty to hear their views, and a duty to consider the proposed develop-
ment with respect to its effect on all neighboring property owners. We are also
satisfied that adjoining landowners who are not city residents may enforce these
duties by appropriate legal proceedings and have standing to challenge zoning
decisions of the city which affect their property.
6 Cal. 3d at 549, 492 P.2d at 1142, 99 Cal. Rptr. at 750.
166. 375 F. Supp. 574 (N.D. Cal. 1974). In declaring Petaluma's ordinance uncon-
stitutional, the court based its decision on the "fundamental right" of freedom to travel,
id. at 581, and did not reach the plaintiffs' other contentions that the ordinance was
invalid under the commerce clause or the equal protection clause. Id. at 586. The court
distinguished its holding from that of the Supreme Court in Village of Belle Terre v.
Boraas, 416 U.S. 1 (1974), by stating:
It was found there that the right to travel was not involved in a zoning regulation
which prohibited groups of unmarried persons from living together in the village.
In the present case, however, the very reason for being of the "Petaluma Plan" is
to keep people out, a patent attempt to affect such excluded persons right to travel.
Accordingly, unlike the Boraas decision, the compelling governmental interest
standard of review must still be employed in the case at bar, since "fundamental"
rights are affected.
375 F. Supp. at 584 n.1.
167. 375 F. Supp. at 575-81.
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accompanied by a rise in the price of those products. 168 If this
were the only effect, Petaluma's action would be justified in terms
of allocational efficiency."0 9 The court, however, found that there
were other effects: the reduction in the supply of available housing
forced families to retain housing longer.170  This meant that housing
which would have normally been phased out of the market would be
retained longer with a resulting decrease in the overall quality of hous-
ing in the region.' 7 ' There would also be a corresponding increase in
the public services required for the area.'72  Additionally, the court
found that if the supply of housing is maintained at less than demand,
there would be a resulting increase in the density of population within
the areas which have not limited the construction of housing. Implicit
in this finding was the conclusion that as the population density in-
creases, the satisfaction to be derived from the use of the land de-
creases. Each of these findings dealt with a technological externality;
each affects the output or satisfaction that can be derived from a given
input, and as such, concerns a factor which should have been consid-
ered by the decision-making community.
Identifying situations in which externalities exist and distinguishing
between those externalities which are important in terms of efficient
allocation of resources (technological) and those which are not (pecu-
niary), while significant, is only part of the problem. The more diffi-
cult task, and the more significant one for resolving the municipal af-
fairs question, is choosing the best means of eliminating the conflict
over the use of resources.
B. Market Transactions and Government Regulation
The potential means of resolving the conflict are as varied as the
imagination of those dealing with the problem, 7 3 but can generally be
grouped in two broad categories: market transactions and government
168. See McK.FAN, supra note 138, at 138-41.
169. Even if the action produced an efficient allocation of resources, there would be
other reasons, such as equitable considerations, for challenging the action of Petaluma
(on other than constitutional grounds). See note 140 supra.
170. 375 F. Supp. at 575-81.
171. Id. at 579-80.
172. Id. at 580. Such services include fire and police protection, schools, recreational
facilities, sanitation facilities, and social services.
173. See, e.g., Ellickson, supra note 122; Marks & Taber, supra note 5; Note, Land
Use Control in Metropolitan Areas: The Failure of Zoning and a Proposed Alternative,
45 S. CAL. L. Rnv. 335 (1972); Note, The Cost-Internalization Case for Class Actions,
21 ST r. L. Rnv. 383 (1969).
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regulation.174  If the conflict created by the competing claims of mu-
nicipalities for the use of common resources can be resolved through
market transactions, there is no sufficient justification for holding that
the subject is a matter of statewide concern. If, however, resolution
of the conflict requires some form of government regulation, suffi-
cient justification exists to support the holding that the subject is not
a municipal affair.
Determination of whether or not the conflict can be resolved through
market transactions requires a brief examination of some basic eco-
nomic concepts. 175 One of the primary concerns of a market econ-
omy176 is to provide a mechanism for determining the most efficient
71
174. Cf. Ellickson, supra note 122, at 684-87; Sax, supra note 136, at 172-76.
175. The analysis which follows is made with the realization that application of eco-
nomic analysis to legal problems is subject to misuse by reason of the failure of some
of the assumptions required by the "competitive market paradigm." Polinsky, Economic
Analysis As A Potentially Defective Product: A Buyer's Guide to Posners Economic
Analysis of Law, 87 HAnv. L. Rv. 1655, 1680-81 (1974) [hereinafter cited as Polin-
sky]. Nevertheless the analysis should provide a basis for explaining why, in a general
sense, land-use control measures should not be considered municipal affairs.
It is not the purpose of this Comment to relate in detail all of the economic argu-
ments with their associated nuances, but merely to apply the basic analysis to the inter-
governmental conflict situation in order to demonstrate why the internalization of the
externalities associated with a zoning decision cannot be accomplished by individual mu-
nicipalities. For the reader who wishes to examine some of the materials dealing with
externalities, see Calabresi, The Decision for Accidents: An Approach to Nonfault Al-
location of Costs, 78 HARv. L. REV. 713 (1965); Calabresi, Transaction Costs, Resource
Allocation and Liability Rules-A Comment, 11 J. LAw & EcoN. 67 (1968); Calabresi,
Fault, Accidents and the Wonderful World of Blum and Kalven, 75 YALE L.J. 216
(1965); Calabresi & Melamed, Property Rules, Liability Rules, and Inalienability: One
View of the Cathedral, 85 H.Iv. L. Rav. 1089 (1972); Coase Theorum Symposium (pts.
1-2), 13 NATuRAL R s. J. 557 (1973), 14 NATURAL REs. J. 1 (1974); Demsetz, Some
Aspects of Property Rights, 9 J. LAw & EcoN. 61 (1966); Demsetz, The Exchange and
Enforcement of Property Rights, 7 J. LAw & ECON. 11 (1964); Demsetz, When Does
the Rule of Liability Matter?, 1 J. LEG. S'rtms 13 (1972); DeVany, supra note 138;
Krier, The Pollution Problem and Legal Institutions: A Conceptual Overview, 18
U.C.L.A. L. REV. 429 (1971); Mishan, Welfare Criteria for External Effects, 51 AM.
EcoN. Rav. 594 (1961); Mishan, Pareto Optimality and the Law, 19 OxFoRD EcON.
PAPERS 255 (1967); Polinsky, supra; Regan, The Problem of Social Cost Revisited, 15
J. LAw & EcON. 427 (1972); Turvey, On Divergencies Between Social Cost and Private
Cost, 30 EcONoMICA 309 (1963); Wellisz, On External Diseconomies and the Govern-
ment-Assisted Invisible Hand, 31 EONOMIcA 345 (1964); Economic Analysis, supra
note 137; Note, The Cost-Internalization Case for Class Actions, 21 STrA. L. REv.
383 (1969).
176. For a general discussion of the free market economy, see R. DoRFmAN, PRucEs
AN MAixs 7 (1967) [hereinafter cited as DORFMAN].
177. In its economic sense an allocation of resources is said to be efficient if there
is no possible reallocation whereby at least one person could gain without making an-
other person lose. Polinsky, supra note 175, at 1664. A change in resource allocation
would be efficient if those who benefit from the change were willing to pay compensa-
tion to those who lose to ensure that the losers will not lose even more. Id.; Michel-
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allocation of resources.178  This mechanism is the price system.' 79
Ideally, it would provide a means of transmitting information 80 that en-
ables the individual participants to determine the most effective em-
ployment of the resources they control.18 ' Assuming -that each partici-
pant acts consistently to maximize his personal welfare, i.e., ration-
ally,"8 2 there will be strong equalizing forces pushing the market price
toward a point of equilibrium. 8 3  In order for the price system to re-
sult in an efficient allocation of resources, the price of each product
must accurately reflect the benefits and costs underlying the price de-
termination. 84 Impediments to the smooth functioning of the market,
resulting from a failure to reflect all benefits or costs, will cause a dis-
tortion of prices, and, therefore, an efficient allocation of resources is
not likely to occur.'8 5 It is in this situation that externalities'8 " exist
man, supra note 62, at 1173. Actual payment of compensation is not required; only
a "hypothetical willingness to pay and accept" is required. Id. at 1177. What is impor-
tant is that over the long run aggregate gains exceed aggregate losses. Compensation
must be paid only to ensure a reasonable expectation that "when the effects of all meas-
ures are summed from time to time, no one will have been hurt while some will have
benefited through the overall collective enterprise," or when the distributional result is
ethically unacceptable. Id.
178. A distinction should be made between allocation, which refers to the mixture of
inputs required to produce a desired output of products or welfare, and distribution,
which refers to the way in which the results of the production are divided. Michelman,
supra note 62, at 1168 n.4; cf. G. SrIGLER, THE THEORY OF Piacn 12-18 (3d ed. 1966)
[hereinafter cited as STIGLER]. Economists generally concern themselves only with the
question of allocation leaving the distributional question to others. Ellickson, supra note
122, at 690; Polinsky, supra note 175, at 1669.
179. The price system is a system of economic organization in which each indi-
vidual. . decides for himself what contribution he will make to the economy with
the understanding that he can obtain the goods and services contributed by other
individuals only at prices acceptable to them.
R. DORFMAN, Tim PRicE SYsTEM 3 (1964). For a discussion and analysis of the estab-
lishment of prices in a competitive market, see STIGLER, supra note 178, at 176-90.
180. DORFMAN, supra note 176, at 7; R. DORFMAN, THE PIcE SYSTEM 6-10 (1964).
181. Each participant possesses certain factor endowments or resources such as per-
sonal skills, physical assets, and capital. Cf. Polinsky, supra note 175, at 1666.
182. The idea of acting rationally in an economic sense is an outgrowth of the utility
theory which in general terms advanced the concept that a person acted with a view
to maximizing his pleasure or utility. The substance of this theory has been retained
in modem economic analysis. See STIGLER, supra note 178, at 46-83.
183. The equilibrium point represents that point at which supply equals demand for
any given commodity. When either supply or demand changes, there will be a corre-
sponding change in the other and in the equilibrium price. DORFMAN, supra note 176,
at 25; see Polinsky, supra note 175, at 1666.
184. 0. ECESTEiN, PUBLIC FINANCE 11 (1964).
185. Id. It is possible, however, that even where prices do not reflect all benefits and
costs, an efficient allocation of resources could result by accident.
186. See note 138 supra and accompanying text.
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and for which it is necessary to provide a means of internalization. 187
To understand the significance of these impediments with respect to
the market's capacity for conflict resolution, it will be useful to examine
the market process in its purest form, i.e., when there are no impedi-
ments to its smooth functioning. 8 In a free market, rights are clearly
defined and freely transferable. Each participant has complete knowl-
edge of every factor bearing on any transaction, and there are no costs
of initiating, negotiating, or enforcing the transaction agreement; it is
a market of perfect competition. Suppose City A is considering a zon-
ing change to allow commercial development of a presently vacant area
near its common border with City B, which will have the effect of re-
ducing the satisfaction and enjoyment the residents of City B derive
from the use of their residentially zoned property.' 89 Suppose also that
the proposed commercial development will generate increased traffic
and noise and will necessitate an increase in expenditures by City B
for street maintenance and traffic control and that the total loss to City
B will be five.190 In the absence of a rule imposing liability on City A
for the damage,"1" City B would offer to pay up to five to City A
in return for its agreement to forgo the proposed zoning change. 9
The acceptance of the offer would represent income to City A, while
the rejection of the offer would represent a loss of income. 93 Whether
accepted or rejected, the cost of City A's decision to City B will have
been internalized and incorporated in City A's decisional calculus. If
the benefit from the proposed action exceeded the amount of the offer,
the action would be taken. If the benefit did not exceed the amount
of the offer, the action would then not be taken and the offer would
be accepted. For example, if City A expected to derive a benefit of
six by proceeding with the zoning change, the offer of five could be
187. Internalization is used to describe the process whereby the external costs of an
action are brought to bear on the decision-making process. For a brief discussion of
alternative means, see Note, The Cost-Internalization Case for Class Actions, 21 STAN.
L. REv. 383, 398-404 (1969).
188. Such a market exists only in theory. See text accompanying notes 199-201 infra.
189. Such a loss is equally as important as physical outputs derived from the use of
resources. Cf. McKean, supra note 138, at 135.
190. The numbers used here have been arbitrarily chosen to represent some unspeci-
fied unit of value. They are not meant to correspond to any actual real world value,
but are used for purposes of illustration only.
191. This is the situation that presently exists in the absence of a successful nuisance
or inverse condemnation suit. The normal remedy is to seek declaratory relief to deter-
mine the constitutionality of the zoning ordinance.
192. The offer actually made would depend upon the probability that the action would
really be taken. Coase, supra note 136, at 7.
193. Cf. id.
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rejected and City A could still obtain a benefit of one.' 94 If, however,
City A expected to derive a benefit of four from the proposed change,
City A would then be willing to accept anything greater than four to
retain the present zoning, and since City B would offer up to five, both
cities could benefit by reaching agreement at an amount between four
and five.' 95
If liability were imposed on City A for the damage caused by its zon-
ing decision,196 the cost imposed on City B would be included in City
A's decisional calculus by considering its potential liability. The same
considerations as above would apply here as well. If the future benefit
is greater than the potential liability, it would then still be beneficial
to City A to institute the change. If, however, the future benefit is
less than the potential liability, City A would then choose to retain its
present zoning scheme. 197  The result in either situation, whether or
not liability is imposed, is that City A must consider the impact of its
decision on City B. In both cases the price reflects all of the benefits
and costs, and an efficient allocation of resources should be obtained. 9 8
If conflicts between municipalities were as easily resolved as they
would be in a market free of impediments, there would be no need
to alter the current state of the municipal affairs doctrine. That free
market, however, is not a realistic assumption. 99 The costs of operat-
ing the market frequently outweigh any gain to be derived from the
bargaining process. These costs, often referred to as transaction
costs,200 include costs of negotiating, administering -the bargain, and
194. By choosing to take the action, City A will receive a benefit of six, while it could
have received five from City B by not taking the action. Therefore the net benefit de-
rived from the decision is one.
195. Any agreed upon sum greater than four and less than five would benefit both
parties. See Coase, supra note 136, at 2-8.
196. Diminution in value caused by a zoning restriction is generally held to be a non-
compensable exercise of the police power. Even where the ordinance is declared to be
invalid, the "usual remedy has been through nullification of the offending ordinances."
Badler, Municipal Zoning Liability in Damages-A New Cause of Action, 5 Uiu. LAw.
25 (1973); see notes 62-191 supra.
197. Coase, supra note 136, at 5.
198. This is, of course, the goal of any zoning scheme. See text accompanying notes
140-44 supra. A basic premise of Coase's article is that rules of liability are neutral
as they relate to allocation, i.e., resources will be allocated the same in a free market,
whether liability is imposed on City A or not. It is only necessary to know which situa-
tion exists so that the market may function properly. Coase, supra note 136, at 8.
199. "[Aln economist would be hard put to find any situation where the assignment
of liability has an absolutely neutral effect on resource allocation." Randall, Coasian
Externality Theory in a Policy Context, 14 NATruRAL REs. J. 35, 44 (1974). Coase also
admits that this is an unrealistic assumption. Coase, supra note 136, at 15.
200. The term, as used in this Comment, includes all costs which prevent the market
[Vol. 8
1975] EXTERNALITIES AND MUNICIPAL AFFAIRS 467
making capital outlays to carry out the bargain.20' Professor Coase
points out:
Once the costs of carrying out market transactions are taken into account
it is clear that such a rearrangement of rights [that will lead to an in-
crease in the value of production] will only be undertaken when the
increase in the value of production consequent upon the rearrangement
is greater -than the costs which would be involved in bringing it about.20 2
Professor Coase recognizes the idea that there may be situations in
which potential gains could be realized in an impediment-free market
but which are not realized because of transaction costs. The problem
is finding a means whereby the externalities can be internalized and
resources efficiently allocated.20 3
Numerous costs might detract from any potential gain to be derived
from bargaining between Cities A and B. To illustrate the problem,
mechanism from functioning smoothly but not all costs which prevent the efficient allo-
cation of resources. See Polinsky, supra note 175, at 1667 n.67.
201. Coase, supra note 136, at 15; Mishan, supra note 139, at 69 (the most significant
of these costs are those of negotiating which includes the costs of taking the initiative
and organizing the participants).
202. Coase, supra note 136, at 15.
203. Some suggest that this should be accomplished by reducing transaction costs so
the market can function freely and that to accomplish this liability rules should favor
the cheapest cost avoider. See, e.g., Coase, supra note 136, at 16. Others suggest that
the solution must be determined on an ad hoc basis and that attempting to mimic the
market may result in shifting costs rather than reducing them. See, e.g., Polinsky, supra
note 175, at 1673-74. It should also be noted that government regulation as a means
of internalization, particularly in the area of land use, has been attacked. "[D]irect
governmental regulation will not necessarily give better results than leaving the problem
to be solved by the market or the firm." Coase, supra note 136, at 18. In the area
of zoning, the use of governmental intervention has also been assailed.
One option for handling externalities from unneighborly land uses is to adopt a
laissez faire distribution of property rights, and rely entirely upon informal social
forces rather than governmental action to control land use decisions .... [Legal
sanctions are among the least civilized ways of handling conflicts between neigh-
bors.
Ellickson, supra note 122, at 685. It has been contended that while government regula-
tion may be justified when the value of the resource is low in comparison to the costs
of acquiring the necessary information to support a freely functioning pricing system,
such regulation is inefficient and should give way to the use of the pricing system when
the value of the resource exceeds the cost of information acquisition. Krier & Montgom-
ery, Resource Allocation, Information Cost and the Form of Government Intervention,
13 NATuRAL RaS. J. 89 (1973) [hereinafter cited as Krier & Montgomery]. The use
of government intervention, particularly in the field of zoning, is supported by Richard
Babcock, who views zoning as an "adjunct of the market mechanism," stating:
We start with the premise that the arrangement of the community land uses should
be the product of social preferences; and that, but for the imperfections of the real
estate market, the market interactions of demand and supply would create a city
so arranged. Thus we view city planning as a device for releasing the basic forces
of demand rather than inhibiting them.
R. BABCOCK, THE ZoNiNG GAME 117 (1966) (citations omitted).
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however, it will be necessary to identify only a few. First, there are
the costs of gathering the information required to effectively measure
the harm caused by the proposed zoning change.20 4 Much of the dam-
age will be subjective and difficult to quantify.200  For example, what
is the value of the loss due to the increased noise?20 6 Other elements
of damage, while not as subjective, may still be speculative. The
increase in the flow of traffic may necessitate increased expendi-
tures for street maintenance, a factor which at best can only be
approximated by traffic studies and projections. 7 In addition, costs
associated with the bargaining process itself may diminish the benefits
of using a bargaining process. The problem of convincing a majority
of those responsible for determining whether or not an offer should be
made 208 that the offer could result in a gain to the party making
the offer creates additional barriers to the effective utilization of this
process. It may be politically impossible to convince enough people
that public funds should be paid to a neighboring municipality to force
alteration of its planned zoning change.
The existence of transaction costs precludes resolution of the conflict
between the municipalities through market transactions except in situa-
tions where the potential gains from a given transaction are sufficiently
large.20 9 Where they are not, it will be necessary to provide an alter-
nate method of resolving the conflict. This will require a reallocation
of the power to govern certain aspects of land-use control, from the mu-
nicipalities to a level of government having a broader jurisdiction. The
balance struck in favor of local interests by past decisions confronting
land-use control measures must be shifted to broader statewide inter-
ests especially when the conflict over the use of resources exceeds mu-
nicipal boundaries.
V. CONCLUSION
The goal of this Comment was to provide a rationale for the conclu-
204. See generally Krier & Montgomery, supra note 203; Polinsky, supra note 175,
at 1668.
205. Merely because they are difficult to measure does not justify their being ignored.
Economic Analysis, supra note 137, at 297.
206. See Village of Belle Terre v. Boraas, 416 U.S. 1, 5 (1974).
207. See, e.g., I. LmsAy, THE Crry 63-65 (1969); A. MAcDoNALD, AMmICAN CrrY
GOvERNMENT AND ADMnaSrRATION 476-96 (4th ed. 1946).
208. This would be considered a cost of negotiating. See note 201 supra.
209. If the potential gains or losses are sufficiently high, then it would still pay to
attempt to "bargain" though the transaction costs are high as well. Cf. Krier & Mont-
gomery, supra note 203.
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sion that land-use control measures having an impact beyond the mu-
nicipal borders should be considered a municipal affair. The initial im-
pact of such a decision would be to bring charter cities within the ambit
of state laws pertaining to local planning and zoning regulations.210
This would eliminate any question concerning the current requirement
that charter cities must adopt general plans," 1 but would have little effect
otherwise because the legislature has declared that such laws do not
apply to charter cities. 2 12 The real significance of such a determination
lies in the flexibility the legislature would have in providing means of
resolving conflicts arising from the use of land resources. 21 3 With the
municipal affairs limitation removed, legislative answers to the problem
should be forthcoming.21 4
The conclusion reached by this Comment assumes that police power
measures can be included within the concept of municipal affairs. It
also recognizes that when a municipality regulates the use of its land
so that it influences the use or enjoyment derived from the use of land
in surrounding municipalities, a conflict arises for which a means of res-
olution must be provided. 5 Since the costs of surmounting the con-
210. CAL. Gov'T CODE ANN. § 65100 et seq. (West 1966).
211. Government Code section 65700 provides in part that "charter cities shall adopt
general plans" containing "the mandatory elements." CAL. Gov'T CODE ANN. § 65700
(West Supp. 1975). If the adoption of a general plan were to remain a municipal affair,
this section would be unenforceable against a charter city choosing not to adopt such
a plan. Cf. cases cited in notes 85-104 supra.
212. Government Code section 65700 declares with respect to local planning:
The provisions of this chapter shall not apply to a charter city, except to the extent
that the same may be adopted by charter or ordinance of the city; except that char-
ter cities shall adopt general plans in any case . . . and such plans shall contain
the mandatory elements ....
CAL. Gov'T CODE ANN. § 65700 (West Supp. 1975). Government Code section 65803
(CAL. Gov'T CODE ANN. § 65803 (West 1966)) is similarly worded but contains only
the exception as to adoption by charter or ordinance.
213. As an initial step the legislature should repeal sections 65700 and 65803. By re-
pealing these sections charter cities would be required by section 65305 to submit the
general plan to the planning agencies of neighboring governments for comment. The
efficacy of such a requirement, which is directory and not mandatory, may be of ques-
tionable effect in resolving conflicts over land resources, but it would at least be a step
in the right direction. Charter cities would also be brought under the requirement found
in section 65860 directing that zoning ordinances be consistent with the general plan.
Cf. Opinion of Legislative Counsel of California, 1972 SENATE J. 8013, 8014-17.
214. The range of possible solutions is as broad as the legislative imagination. Per-
haps the most viable solution is the creation of area councils made up of representatives
of municipal bodies within the jurisdiction of the council, which would have sufficient
authority to resolve any conflicts over the use of land resources while having maximum
responsibility for determining the most effective use of the land to the local government
bodies.
215. There are indications that the legislature has realized its important role and will
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ffict at the local level generally exceed the benefits to be derived, the
problem must be approached on a broader scale. The interests of solv-
ing municipal problems at the local level must be subordinated to the
statewide interests of providing for an efficient use of resources.
Acceptance of this premise necessarily leads to the conclusion that
land-use control measures which have an effect beyond the municipal
borders must be considered matters of statewide concern. This conclu-
sion is consistent with the cases involving extra-municipal improvement
projects where the courts have concluded that the carrying out of such
projects become matters of statewide concern when they transcend the
municipal borders even though they would have been considered mu-
nicipal affairs if confined within municipal boundaries. The cases in-
volved with the adoption of land-use control measures are equally con-
sistent with the conclusion of this Comment if limited to the narrow
subject of adopting local ordinances.216
The municipal affairs doctrine is a legitimate and worthwhile concept
when properly applied, but it serves only to hamper the efficient use
of resources when it is applied to problems which cannot be effectively
managed at the municipal level. Only if this restriction is eliminated
can the conflict over the use of resources be resolved.
David R. McEwen
take steps to provide a means for resolving conflicts over the use of land. See, e.g.,
Cal. A.B. 2978, Reg. Sess. (1973-1974) (provides for the administration, at the state
level, of land use planning and for coordination of planning among the state and local
governments).
It has been suggested that externalities can be dealt with best if the rights to a re-
source are the exclusive rights of one person and if the rights are freely exchangeable
and easily enforceable. DeVany, supra note 138. Such characteristics could be easily
embodied in a regional zoning agency.
216. The method of adopting an ordinance does not significantly affect those beyond
the borders (presuming compliance with minimum due process measures). It is only
when these latter cases are extended to encompass the substantive aspects of land-use
control that they become inconsistent with the conclusion of this Comment. See text
accompanying notes 85-104 supra.
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